The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets
Open accessAbstract
We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers and outline a series of open research questions.
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Self-citationAsymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
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Cited by
Predictably Unequal? The Effects of Machine Learning on Credit Markets
Fuster, A., Goldsmith-Pinkham, P. S., Ramadorai, T., & Walther, A. (2017) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3072038 · Cited by 769
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
(2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845354 · Cited by 659
Predictably Unequal? The Effects of Machine Learning on Credit Markets
FUSTER, A., GOLDSMITH‐PINKHAM, P., RAMADORAI, T., & WALTHER, A. (2022) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.13090 · Cited by 872
Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices*
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., & Cullen, M. R. (2010) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.877 · Cited by 452
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., & Levin, J.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2010-09-04
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 311-336
- ISSN
- 1941-1383 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1391
- OpenAlex
- W2112688840
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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