The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change
Abstract
Incumbent political leaders risk deposition by challengers within the existing political rules and by revolutionary threats. Building on Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow's selectorate theory, the model here examines the policy responses of office-seeking leaders to revolutionary threats. Whether leaders suppress public goods such as freedom of assembly and freedom of information to hinder the organizational ability of potential revolutionaries or appease potential revolutionaries by increasing the provision of public goods depends, in part, on the sources of government revenues. Empirical tests show that governments with access to revenue sources that require few labor inputs by the citizens, such as natural resource rents or foreign aid, reduce the provision of public goods and increase the odds of increased authoritarianism in the face of revolutionary pressures. In contrast, without these sources of unearned revenues, governments respond to revolutionary pressures by increasing the provision of public goods and democratizing.
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Cites
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
Lipset, S. M. (1959) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951731 · Cited by 7,050 · cited 1×
“For Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), the path to democracy was through economic growth.”
BackgroundNorth, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth
Sachs, J., & Warner, A. (1995) · doi:10.3386/w5398 · Cited by 4,461
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 11×
“position in the ordering, as assumed in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) .”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDemocracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Modernization: Theories and Facts
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0004 · Cited by 1,983
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962769 · Cited by 430
Cited by
Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592714000851 · Cited by 1,537
Political Order and One-Party Rule
Magaloni, B., & Kricheli, R. (2010) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220529 · Cited by 634
Lorentzen, P. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12065 · Cited by 602
Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance
De Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00463.x · Cited by 475
Self-citationAn Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
HILL, D. W., & JONES, Z. M. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000306 · Cited by 450
Metadata
- Authors
- de Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2008-10-10
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 167-197
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W2144434076
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 26.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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