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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs

Gershon, Rachel, Cryder, Cynthia, John, Leslie K. · 2020 · Journal of Marketing Research

Abstract

Selfish incentives typically outperform prosocial incentives, and customer referral programs frequently use such “selfish” (i.e., sender-benefiting) incentives to incentivize current customers to recruit new customers. However, in two field experiments and a fully incentivized lab experiment, this research finds that “prosocial” (i.e., recipient-benefiting) referral incentives recruit more new customers. Five subsequent experiments test a process account for this effect, identifying two key psychological mechanisms: reputational benefits and action costs. First, at the referral stage, senders (existing customers) anticipate reputational benefits for referring recipients (potential new customers), who receive a reward for signing up. These reputational benefits render recipient-benefiting referrals just as effective as sender-benefiting referrals at the relatively low-cost referral stage. Second, at the uptake stage, recipient-benefiting referrals are more effective than sender-benefiting referrals: recipient-benefiting referrals directly incentivize recipients to sign up, providing a clear reward for an otherwise costly uptake decision. The preponderance of selfish, or sender-benefiting, referral incentives in the marketplace suggests these effects are unanticipated by marketers who design incentive schemes.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1177/0022243719888440

Cites

56 of 56 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 60 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Bapna Ravi, 2014, Workshop on Information Systems and Economics (WISE)
  2. Glazer Amihai, 1996, American Economic Review, 86, 1019
  3. Simmons Joseph P., 2012, Dialogue, 26, 4

Cited by

See all 60

Metadata

Authors
Gershon, R., Cryder, C., & John, L. K.
Affiliations
  • University of California San Diego (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Gershon, Rachel
Venue
Journal of Marketing Research
Published
2019-12-05
Volume
57
Issue
1
Pages
156-172
ISSN
  • 0022-2437 (ISSN-L)
  • 1547-7193
OpenAlex
W2942651659
Cited by
60
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 2
FWCI
4.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
Locations
Journal of Marketing Research (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Digital Marketing and Social Media
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
referral rewards, customer referral programs, reputational benefits, action costs, customer acquisition, incentive design

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0022243719888440
The paper
Gershon, R., Cryder, C., & John, L. K. (2020). Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs. Journal of Marketing Research. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022243719888440

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.