The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war
Open accessAbstract
Theories of mobilization suggest that groups are more likely to resort to violence in the presence of political opportunity structures that afford greater prospects for extracting concessions from the government or better opportunities to topple ruling governments. However, existing efforts to consider the possible influences of political opportunity structures on incentives for violence and civil war empirically have almost invariably relied upon measures of democracy to proxy for the hypothesized mechanisms, most notably the argument that the opposing effects of political accommodation and repression will give rise to an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and the risk of civil war. The authors detail a number of problems with measures of democracy as proxies for political opportunity structures and develop alternative measures based on the likely risks that political leaders will lose power in irregular challenges and their implications for the incentives for resort to violence. The authors evaluate empirically how the security with which leaders hold office influences the prospects of violent civil conflict. The findings indicate that recent irregular leader entry and transitions indeed increase the risk of conflict onset, while democratic institutions are found to decrease the risk of civil war, after controlling for the new measures of state weakness.
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Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
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Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset
GLEDITSCH, N. P., WALLENSTEEN, P., ERIKSSON, M., SOLLENBERG, M., & STRAND, H. (2002) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007 · Cited by 3,846
Conceptualizing Political Opportunity
Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. C. (2004) · Social Forces · doi:10.1353/sof.2004.0082 · Cited by 1,051 · cited 1×
“The findings indicate that recent irregular leader entry and transitions indeed increase the risk of conflict onset, while democratic institutions are found to decrease the risk of civil war, after controlling for the new measures of state weakness.”
BackgroundMeasuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict
Hendrix, C. S. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310361838 · Cited by 795
It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome
Cunningham, D. E., Skrede Gleditsch, K., & Salehyan, I. (2009) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002709336458 · Cited by 671
Davenport, C. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111650 · Cited by 623
The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy
Vreeland, J. R. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708315594 · Cited by 562
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The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa
Roessler, P. (2011) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887111000049 · Cited by 481
Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies
Celestino, M. R., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2013) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343312469979 · Cited by 265
Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’
ROZENAS, A., & ZHUKOV, Y. M. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055419000066 · Cited by 264
Hegre, H. (2014) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343313512852 · Cited by 255
Climate variability, economic growth, and civil conflict
Koubi, V., Bernauer, T., Kalbhenn, A., & Spilker, G. (2012) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343311427173 · Cited by 192
Metadata
- Authors
- Skrede Gleditsch, K., & Ruggeri, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Peace Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-05-01
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 299-310
- ISSN
- 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3578
- OpenAlex
- W2121478465
- Cited by
- 250
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 20.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.