The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet; 9 of the 49 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Many authoritarian regimes selectively provide critical segments of the population with privileged access to goods and services, expecting political support in return. This article is interested in the effects of this regime strategy: Is violent opposition less likely to occur in subnational regions bound to the ruling elite through such patron–client networks? For its empirical analysis, the article makes use of crowdsourcing data on the number and geospatial distribution of fatalities in the Syrian civil war from March 2011 to November 2012. In terms of selective goods provision, the focus is on the electricity sector. Satellite images of the earth at night are used to proxy spatial variations in the public distribution of electricity in times of power shortages. These data are complemented with information from the last Syrian population census of 2004. Estimations from fixed effect logit models lend support to the hypothesis that the risk of violence has been lower in subdistricts that have been favored by the ruling regime in terms of preferential access to material goods. This hypothesis is further corroborated with qualitative evidence from Syrian localities.
Verified 2026-11-22 · 1 reference not checked yet
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper argues that selective state provision of electricity in Syria functioned as patronage and was associated with lower subnational violence during the early civil war. Using nightlights and crowdsourced fatality data for 261 Syrian subdistricts, the authors find that subdistricts favored in electricity provision had a lower risk of violence.
## Key findings
- The analysis covers 261 Syrian subdistricts and violence from March 2011 to November 2012; the authors report that their main fixed-effects logit models support the hypothesis that violence risk was lower in favored subdistricts.
- In the main model, moving from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the first main electricity variable lowered the predicted risk of violence from 43% to approximately 4% on average across governorates.
- For the nightlight change-rate measure, the predicted risk of violence dropped from 33% to 4% in a similar simulation.
- Subdistricts with an increase in light output from 2008 to 2009 showed a 16% lower risk of experiencing violence than other subdistricts; in Table I, the associated coefficient is -1.849 with p = 0.008.
- Robustness checks using alternative fatality thresholds (5, 10, 20, 50), a shorter outcome window, count models, and exclusions of certain governorates were reported as broadly consistent with the main findings.
## Methods
- Cross-sectional subdistrict-level study of Syria; the sample began with 274 subdistricts and was reduced to 261 after excluding the nine Golan Heights subdistricts and four geographically irregular subdistricts.
- Dependent variable: binary indicator of violence in March 2011–November 2012, coded using a threshold of 25 reported deaths based on crowdsourced Syria Tracker fatality data.
- Main explanatory variables: three electricity-provision measures derived from annual nighttime satellite imagery for 2004–2009—absolute change in mean light output from 2007 to 2009, relative change, and a dummy for whether light output increased from 2008 to 2009.
- Main analysis: fixed-effects logit models with governorate-level fixed effects, clustered standard errors where possible, plus robustness checks using alternative thresholds and count models.
## Limitations
- The authors explicitly state that they cannot make strong causal claims because the study is based on a cross-sectional analysis alone.
- They note that collapsing fatalities into a binary measure loses “substantial amounts of information” from the data.
- Evident from the text: the electricity measure is a proxy based on nightlights, so it may not perfectly capture actual patron-client favoritism or electricity access at the local level.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
9 Valid · 6 Not valid · 26 Not checked · 79 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“According to Fabrice Balanche (2011), it was precisely the decreased availability of financial resources in times of economic liberalization that contributed to the continuing and in some cases increased importance of patron-client networks.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Balanche, 2011 matched to “Géographie de la révolte syrienne” (2011) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Les transitions économique et démographique produisent une crise sociale” (page unavailable), Balanche says the state no longer has the means to fund its previous policies and that economic liberalization concentrates growth among regime associates. “La périphérie du territoire alaouite” (page unavailable) describes privileged access through networks of power amid worsening economic conditions. The paper does not say that reduced financial resources caused patron-client networks to retain or increase their importance. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“De Cha ˆtel (2014) shows that during the harsh drought years of 2006 to 2009 in the agriculture-based northeast, the regime provided emergency help first and foremost to those selected, well-connected farmers who had already profited from the distribution of state land and subsidized fertilizers (see also Balanche, 2011).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites De Châtel, 2014 matched to “The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: Untangling the triggers of the revolution” (2014) source
- Partly supportedcites Balanche, 2011 matched to “Géographie de la révolte syrienne” (2011) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“those areas with strong ties have remained calm”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Leenders & Heydemann, 2012 matched to “Popular mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and threat, and the social networks of the early risers” (2012) source
- Not matchedcites Balanche (2013)
An author–year citation the paper’s reference list doesn’t settle. We don’t search these by name.
- Partly supportedcites Ismail, 2013 matched to “Urban subalterns in the Arab revolutions: Cairo and Damascus in comparative perspective” (2013) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Elements of Urban Division: Subalternity in Informal Quarters” (page unavailable), the paper says the clientelized quarter Mezza 86 maintained a loyalist position during the uprising. It does not say such areas remained calm during the civil war; it also reports that young men from clientelized quarters joined groups attacking demonstrations. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Taken together, there is ample qualitative evidence supporting the claim that the selective redistribution of scarce resources took place in areas where the regime had strong clientelist networks.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Leenders & Heydemann, 2012 matched to “Popular mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and threat, and the social networks of the early risers” (2012) source
- Not matchedcites Balanche (2013)
An author–year citation the paper’s reference list doesn’t settle. We don’t search these by name.
- Partly supportedcites Ismail, 2013 matched to “Urban subalterns in the Arab revolutions: Cairo and Damascus in comparative perspective” (2013) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Elements of Urban Division: Subalternity in Informal Quarters” (page unavailable), the paper describes employment, bureaucratic favors, housing, and infrastructure provision in clientelized Damascus quarters. This supports selective benefits linked to regime clients, but the passages do not establish that scarce resources were redistributed specifically to areas with strong clientelist networks. (LLM, conf=0.83)
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Detailed qualitative studies of different Syrian localities since early 2011 strongly indicate that villages, towns, or cities without ties to dense regime-based patron-client networks before the uprising have indeed been very likely to experience violence in the early phase of the civil war.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Leenders & Heydemann, 2012 matched to “Popular mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and threat, and the social networks of the early risers” (2012) source
- Not matchedcites Balanche (2013)
An author–year citation the paper’s reference list doesn’t settle. We don’t search these by name.
- Partly supportedcites Ismail, 2013 matched to “Urban subalterns in the Arab revolutions: Cairo and Damascus in comparative perspective” (2013) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Elements of Urban Division: Subalternity in Informal Quarters” (page unavailable), Ismail contrasts clientelized quarters that supplied forces attacking demonstrations with excluded quarters in conflict with the regime. “The Socio-Spatiality of the Syrian Uprising” (page unavailable) likewise describes attacks on participating quarters in Homs. These local accounts support a link between regime ties and violence, but not the broader claim that villages, towns, or cities lacking dense patron-client ties were very likely to experience violence in the early civil war. (LLM, conf=0.84)
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Metadata
- Authors
- De Juan, A., & Bank, A.
- Affiliations
- German Institute of Global and Area Studies
- German Institute for Global and Area Studies (DE)
- ORCID
- Bank, André
- Venue
- Journal of Peace Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2015-01-01
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 91-104
- ISSN
- 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3578
- OpenAlex
- W2079668072
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 24.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ssoar.info
- Licence
- academic.oup.com/pages/standard-publication-reuse-rights (vor)
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Peace Research (publishedVersion)
- Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) (submittedVersion)
- KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Middle East Politics and Society
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Keywords
- patronage, authoritarian regimes, political violence, Syrian civil war, electricity access, nighttime satellite imagery, Ba'athism, subnational regions, political support, violence risk
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