The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incremental Commitment and Reciprocity in a Real-Time Public Goods Game
Abstract
Allowing players in public goods games to make small incremental commitments to contributing to the good might facilitate cooperation because it helps to prevent players from being “free ridden,” contributing more to the public good than other group members. Two experiments using a real-time version of the voluntary contribution mechanism were conducted to investigate the hypothesis that players are generally willing to contribute public goods conditional on beliefs that others are doing so at similar levels. Experiment 1 provided evidence that affording a strategy of commitment can increase the production of public goods. Experiment 2 provided evidence that most players are willing to contribute to the public good at a level at or slightly above the contribution of the lowest contributor in the group. Both experiments point to inequity aversion as an important element of play in public goods games.
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Cites
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The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement
Gouldner, A. W. (1960) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2092623 · Cited by 12,001
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
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Self-citationDawes, R. M. (1980) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125 · Cited by 2,022
Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped
Rapoport, A., & Eshed-Levy, D. (1989) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(89)90012-5 · Cited by 174
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1991) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7 · Cited by 127
Cited by
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052187 · Cited by 1,184
Tax morale and conditional cooperation
Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006 · Cited by 671
Kimbrough, E. O., & Vostroknutov, A. (2016) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12152 · Cited by 373
Punitive sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device.
Price, M. E., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2002) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(01)00093-9 · Cited by 360
Religious Identity and Economic Behavior
Benjamin, D. J., Choi, J. J., & Fisher, G. (2016) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00586 · Cited by 355
Metadata
- Authors
- Kurzban, R., McCabe, K., Smith, V. L., & Wilson, B. J.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2001-12
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 1662-1673
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2122904513
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 19.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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