Motivated Shifting of Justice Standards
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Three studies test whether group members strategically shift the standard of judgment they use to decide whether a particular ingroup action was unjust. In Study 1, individuals who were highly identified with their ingroup set higher confirmatory injustice standards than low identifiers—they needed more evidence to conclude that their group acted unjustly. This led to reductions in judgments of harm and diminished collective guilt. In Study 2, group identification was experimentally manipulated and the results of Study 1 were replicated. In Study 3, stronger support is provided for the motivational nature of this process. Specifically, the motivation to shift the standard upward was decreased by providing group members with an opportunity to self-affirm at the group level. Participants who self-affirmed set lower confirmatory standards of injustice, rated the harm as more severe, and experienced greater collective guilt than, those not self-affirming. Implications of this quantitative standard shifting are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
The processes of causal attribution.
Kelley, H. H. (1973) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0034225 · Cited by 4,025 · cited 1×
“Interestingly, although stability, distinctiveness, and consensus of the circumstances may still lead to an attribution of racism in this case (Kelley, 1973), people can avoid making an attribution of racism by shifting the standard.”
BackgroundThe Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self
Steele, C. M. (1988) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60229-4 · Cited by 3,697 · cited 2×
“In previous self-affirmation studies (Steele, 1988), participants have been given a list of values and asked to elaborate on the value that is most important to them or their group (selfaffirmation or group affirmation; see Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost, 2007) or on the value that is least important to them…”
MethodDownward comparison principles in social psychology
Wills, T. A. (1981) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.90.2.245 · Cited by 2,705
Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Spears, R. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144 · Cited by 1,826 · cited 1×
“…(Cameron, 2004; Karasawa, 1991; Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002) to tap the correlated dimensions of group identification found by Leach et al. (2008): self-definition (perceiving the self as similar to the ingroup prototype) and self-investment (feeling positively and sharing a…”
BackgroundMoral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction
Opotow, S. (1990) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1990.tb00268.x · Cited by 1,313
Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history.
Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.75.4.872 · Cited by 1,061
Self-citationPrejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self through derogating others.
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.31 · Cited by 1,047
Hastorf, A. H., & Cantril, H. (1954) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0057880 · Cited by 882
Prejudice with and without compunction
Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.60.6.817 · Cited by 572
Biernat, M., & Kobrynowicz, D. (1997) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.3.544 · Cited by 537
Self-citationBiernat, M., & Fuegen, K. (2001) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00237 · Cited by 248 · cited 1×
“A confirmatory evidentiary standard (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001; Biernat & Ma, 2005) is the amount of evidence needed to conclude that a person or group definitively has a particular attribute.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
Cikara, M., Bruneau, E., Van Bavel, J. J., & Saxe, R. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.06.007 · Cited by 480
Noor, M., Shnabel, N., Halabi, S., & Nadler, A. (2012) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868312440048 · Cited by 419
Čehajić-Clancy, S., Effron, D. A., Halperin, E., Liberman, V., & Ross, L. D. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0023936 · Cited by 221
The New Identity Theft: Perceptions of Cultural Appropriation in Intergroup Contexts
Mosley, A. J., & Biernat, M. (2021) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspi0000327 · Cited by 49
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Metadata
- Authors
- Miron, A. M., Branscombe, N. R., & Biernat, M.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2010-05-05
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 768-779
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2034941958
- Cited by
- 127
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 33.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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