The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template
Abstract
Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is “no.” Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition—in both liberals and conservatives—is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested—and confirmed—through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes—and overlaps with—diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 · Cited by 4,904 · cited 1×
“If conservatives do have a wider moral domain (a premise argued against by the current data), this may stem simply from the fact that conservatives see relatively more threat in the world (i.e., potential harm; Jost et al., 2003).”
BackgroundLiberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015141 · Cited by 4,560
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0021847 · Cited by 2,666
Social evaluation by preverbal infants
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06288 · Cited by 1,566
A cognitive developmental approach to morality: investigating the psychopath
Blair, R. (1995) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00676-p · Cited by 1,529
Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387 · Cited by 1,008
Self-citationHypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe
Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01614.x · Cited by 851
From emotion resonance to empathic understanding: A social developmental neuroscience account
Decety, J., & Meyer, M. (2008) · Development and Psychopathology · doi:10.1017/s0954579408000503 · Cited by 597 · cited 1×
“…of suffering victims (Blair, 1995), the hypersensitivity of agency detection (Barrett, 2004), the early development of empathy and harm-based concerns (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Govrin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and the obvious evolutionary importance of harm (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013).”
Background
Cited by
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 659
Self-citationRobots As Intentional Agents: Using Neuroscientific Methods to Make Robots Appear More Social
Wiese, E., Metta, G., & Wykowska, A. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01663 · Cited by 286
Personal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts
Kubin, E., Puryear, C., Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2008389118 · Cited by 209
Self-citationClark, C. J., & Winegard, B. M. (2020) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2020.1721233 · Cited by 128
Binding moral values gain importance in the presence of close others
Yudkin, D. A., Gantman, A. P., Hofmann, W., & Quoidbach, J. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-22566-6 · Cited by 47
Metadata
- Authors
- Schein, C., & Gray, K.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-06-19
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1147-1163
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W1807244228
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 7.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0146167215591501
- The paper
- Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2015). The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215591501
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.