Cited by 47Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentCultural Differences and ValuesEthics in Business and Education

Binding moral values gain importance in the presence of close others

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Yudkin, Daniel A., Gantman, Ana P., Hofmann, Wilhelm, Quoidbach, Jordi·2021·Nature Communications

Abstract

A key function of morality is to regulate social behavior. Research suggests moral values may be divided into two types: binding values, which govern behavior in groups, and individualizing values, which promote personal rights and freedoms. Because people tend to mentally activate concepts in situations in which they may prove useful, the importance they afford moral values may vary according to whom they are with in the moment. In particular, because binding values help regulate communal behavior, people may afford these values more importance when in the presence of close (versus distant) others. Five studies test and support this hypothesis. First, we use a custom smartphone application to repeatedly record participants’ (n = 1166) current social context and the importance they afforded moral values. Results show people rate moral values as more important when in the presence of close others, and this effect is stronger for binding than individualizing values—an effect that replicates in a large preregistered online sample (n = 2016). A lab study (n = 390) and two preregistered online experiments (n = 580 and n = 752) provide convergent evidence that people afford binding, but not individualizing, values more importance when in the real or imagined presence of close others. Our results suggest people selectively activate different moral values according to the demands of the situation, and show how the mere presence of others can affect moral thinking.

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  • The mere presence of others, even if imagined, amplifies moral values.

    “First, the mere presence of others, even if imagined, amplifies moral values48.”

    From Nostalgia increases punitiveness by intensifying moral concern (2024) · cites this paper as [48]

    The Abstract and Discussion report that the real or imagined presence of close others increases the importance afforded to binding moral values. The claim broadens this to the presence of others generally and to moral values generally; the Discussion says individualizing values do not reliably change with relational context. Page numbers are not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.90)

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  1. [12]Harcourt, A. H. & de Waal, F. B. (eds.) in Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals 445–471 (Oxford University Press, 1992).
  2. [18]Trivers RL The evolution of reciprocal altruism Q. Rev. Biol. 1971 46 35 57 10.1086/406755 · DOI · Paper page
  3. [21]Shiffrin, R. M. & Dumais, S. T. in Cognitive Skills and Their Acquisition (ed. Anderson, A. R.) 111–140 (Taylor & Francis Group, 1981).
  4. [40]Kollock, P. in Modeling Rational and Moral Agents (ed. Danielson, P.) 186–210 (Oxford University Press, 1998).
  5. [48]Monin, B., & Merritt, A. in Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology, The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil, Vol. 3 (eds Mikulincer, M. & Shaver, P.) 167–184 (American Psychological Association, 2012).

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Authors
Yudkin, D. A., Gantman, A. P., Hofmann, W., & Quoidbach, J.
Affiliations
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
  • Brooklyn College (US)
  • Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
  • Esade (ES)
Corresponding author
Yudkin, Daniel A.
Venue
Nature Communications
Published
2021-05-11
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
2718-2718
ISSN
2041-1723 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3160006781
Cited by
47
References
66
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1
FWCI
4.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Nature Communications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • CUNY Academic Works (City University of New York) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Cultural Differences and Values
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
Keywords
moral values, close others, social environment, moral thought, situational demands, social behavior
MeSH terms
Peer Influence, Adult, Culture, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Morals, Peer Group, Politics, Surveys and Questionnaires, Social Adjustment, Social Conformity

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