When and Why We See Victims as Responsible: The Impact of Ideology on Attitudes Toward Victims
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why do victims sometimes receive sympathy for their suffering and at other times scorn and blame? Here we show a powerful role for moral values in attitudes toward victims. We measured moral values associated with unconditionally prohibiting harm (“individualizing values”) versus moral values associated with prohibiting behavior that destabilizes groups and relationships (“binding values”: loyalty, obedience to authority, and purity). Increased endorsement of binding values predicted increased ratings of victims as contaminated (Studies 1-4); increased blame and responsibility attributed to victims, increased perceptions of victims’ (versus perpetrators’) behaviors as contributing to the outcome, and decreased focus on perpetrators (Studies 2-3). Patterns persisted controlling for politics, just world beliefs, and right-wing authoritarianism. Experimentally manipulating linguistic focus off of victims and onto perpetrators reduced victim blame. Both binding values and focus modulated victim blame through victim responsibility attributions. Findings indicate the important role of ideology in attitudes toward victims via effects on responsibility attribution.
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Cites
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Background
Cited by
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
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Contextualizing the impostor "syndrome"
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Metadata
- Authors
- Niemi, L., & Young, L.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2016-07-11
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1227-1242
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2468525879
- Cited by
- 154
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 8.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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