Using Power as a Negative Cue: How Conspiracy Mentality Affects Epistemic Trust in Sources of Historical Knowledge
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Classical theories of attitude change point to the positive effect of source expertise on perceived source credibility persuasion, but there is an ongoing societal debate on the increase in anti-elitist sentiments and conspiracy theories regarding the allegedly untrustworthy power elite. In one correlational ( N = 275) and three experimental studies ( N = 195, N = 464, N = 225), we tested the novel idea that people who endorse a conspiratorial mind-set (conspiracy mentality) indeed exhibit markedly different reactions to cues of epistemic authoritativeness than those who do not: Whereas the perceived credibility of powerful sources decreased with the recipients’ conspiracy mentality, that of powerless sources increased independent of and incremental to other biases, such as the need to see the ingroup in particularly positive light. The discussion raises the question whether a certain extent of source-based bias is necessary for the social fabric of a highly complex society.
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Cites
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“Influential dual process models (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984) have subsequently proposed that when people are motivated and capable of processing the quality of the presented arguments, they typically do so.”
BackgroundGoertzel, T. (1994) · Political Psychology · doi:10.2307/3791630 · Cited by 1,094 · cited 1×
“People differ systematically and reliably in the extent to which they see the fate of the world as determined by the secret plots of a few powerful others (e.g., Goertzel, 1994).”
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“Developing representations of the historical past is essential for constructing one’s social identity (Liu & Hilton, 2005).”
BackgroundSpeaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as A Generalised Political Attitude
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“In fact, power per se then serves as a cue to threat and reduced likeability (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014) and a likely signal for corruption and misuse of power.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citationDead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories
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On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit
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Addicted to answers: need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
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Too special to be duped: need for uniqueness motivates conspiracy beliefs
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Background“I Know Things They Don’t Know!”: The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories
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“As a more subtle way to achieve a more ingroup-flattering version of history, people attribute negative deeds as situationally caused when the perpetrators were ingroup members (e.g., Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Imhoff et al., 2017), thus exhibiting an ultimate attribution error (e.”
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Cited by
Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. (2020) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550620934692 · Cited by 722
Self-citationConspiracy Theories and Their Societal Effects During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Pummerer, L., Böhm, R., Lilleholt, L., Winter, K., Zettler, I., & Sassenberg, K. (2022) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/19485506211000217 · Cited by 329
Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2494 · Cited by 267
Self-citationImhoff, R., Dieterle, L., & Lamberty, P. (2021) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550619896491 · Cited by 260
Self-citationConspiracy theories and their societal effects during the COVID-19 pandemic
Pummerer, L., Böhm, R., Lilleholt, L., Winter, K., Zettler, I., & Sassenberg, K. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/y5grn · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Imhoff, R., Lamberty, P., & Klein, O.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2018-05-02
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1364-1379
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2801965586
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 21.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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