The Complex Relation Between Receptivity to Pseudo-Profound Bullshit and Political Ideology
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This research systematically mapped the relationship between political ideology and receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit—that is, obscure sentences constructed to impress others rather than convey truth. Among Swedish adults ( N = 985), bullshit receptivity was (a) robustly positively associated with socially conservative (vs. liberal) self-placement, resistance to change, and particularly binding moral intuitions (loyalty, authority, purity); (b) associated with centrism on preference for equality and even leftism (when controlling for other aspects of ideology) on economic ideology self-placement; and (c) lowest among right-of-center social liberal voters and highest among left-wing green voters. Most of the results held up when we controlled for the perceived profundity of genuine aphorisms, cognitive reflection, numeracy, information processing bias, gender, age, education, religiosity, and spirituality. The results are supportive of theoretical accounts that posit ideological asymmetries in cognitive orientation, while also pointing to the existence of bullshit receptivity among both right- and left-wingers.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundInfluentialLiberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.
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Effect size guidelines for individual differences researchers
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Cited by
van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., Azevedo, F., & Jost, J. T. (2021) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12681 · Cited by 291
Conspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: implications for political ideology
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The role of cognitive rigidity in political ideologies: theory, evidence, and future directions
Zmigrod, L. (2020) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.10.016 · Cited by 162
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“Consistent with previous suggestions in the literature (Federico & Malka, 2018; Nilsson et al., 2019), social conservatism was a slightly more important factor than economic conservatism when it came to explaining some antiscientific attitudes.”
Result
Metadata
- Authors
- Nilsson, A., Erlandsson, A., & Västfjäll, D.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2019-03-18
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1440-1454
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2912145849
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 15.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Nilsson, A., Erlandsson, A., & Västfjäll, D. (2019). The Complex Relation Between Receptivity to Pseudo-Profound Bullshit and Political Ideology. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219830415
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