Cited by 70Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationSocial Power and Status Dynamics

Social values, subjective transformations, and cooperation in social dilemmas

Simpson, Brent·2004·Social Psychology Quarterly

Abstract

A persistent anomaly in the social dilemmas literature is the surprisingly high level of cooperation observed in experimental investigations of the one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma (PD).The exchange heuristic hypothesis and related approaches explain this finding by arguing that actors subjectively transform PD into the Assurance Dilemma. A tendency to transform PD into Assurance is expected to increase cooperation because defection is the dominant strategy in PD, but not in Assurance. Although existing arguments explain the processes through which these subjective transformations occur, they do not predict who actually makes the transformations. This study incorporates arguments from the social values literature and proposes four hypotheses about who transforms PD and how this affects cooperation. The hypotheses are tested against the results of a new experiment. The results strongly support the hypotheses and the overarching argument that “prosocials” transform PD into Assurance, while “individualists” play PD “as is.”

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Crossref · 10.1177/019027250406700404

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Authors
Simpson, B.
Affiliations
University of South Carolina (US)
Corresponding author
Simpson, Brent
Venue
Social Psychology Quarterly
Published
2004-12
Volume
67
Issue
4
Pages
385-395
ISSN
  • 0190-2725 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-8999
OpenAlex
W2141690270
Cited by
70
References
28
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 2 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 7
FWCI
6.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Social Psychology Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
social dilemmas, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, subjective transformation, social values, one-shot games, defection

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