Cited by 84Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationSocial Power and Status Dynamics

Inducing cooperative behavior among proselfs versus prosocials: the moderating role of incentives and trust

Boone, Christophe, Declerck, Carolyn, Kiyonari, Toko·2010·Journal of Conflict Resolution

Abstract

This study investigates how an individual’s social value orientation (SVO) interacts with explicit cooperative incentives on one hand, and intrinsic and extraneously induced trust on the other hand, to affect cooperative behavior. In three experiments, subjects (n = 322) played a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD; with weak cooperative incentives) and an assurance game (AG; with strong cooperative incentives) in conditions with or without trust signals. The authors found, as expected, that cooperative behavior is strongly spurred by explicit incentives, but not by trust, among people with a proself value orientation. Conversely, trust is very important to enhance cooperative behavior of participants with a prosocial value orientation, whereas explicit incentives are less important compared to proselfs. The authors conclude that this study reveals two fundamentally different logics of cooperative behavior: one based on extrinsic incentives and the other on trust.

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Crossref · 10.1177/0022002710372329

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Authors
Boone, C., Declerck, C., & Kiyonari, T.
Affiliations
  • University of Antwerp (BE)
  • Aoyama Gakuin University (JP)
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
2010-06-15
Volume
54
Issue
5
Pages
799-824
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W2155386274
Cited by
84
References
62
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 8
FWCI
18.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
cooperative behavior, social value orientation, trust, trust signals, prisoner's dilemma, assurance game, extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards

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