The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
You See, the Ends Don’t Justify the Means: Visual Imagery and Moral Judgment
Abstract
We conducted three experiments indicating that characteristically deontological judgments—here, disapproving of sacrificing one person for the greater good of others—are preferentially supported by visual imagery. Experiment 1 used two matched working memory tasks—one visual, one verbal—to identify individuals with relatively visual cognitive styles and individuals with relatively verbal cognitive styles. Individuals with more visual cognitive styles made more deontological judgments. Experiment 2 showed that visual interference, relative to verbal interference and no interference, decreases deontological judgment. Experiment 3 indicated that these effects are due to people’s tendency to visualize the harmful means (sacrificing one person) more than the beneficial end (saving others). These results suggest a specific role for visual imagery in moral judgment: When people consider sacrificing someone as a means to an end, visual imagery preferentially supports the judgment that the ends do not justify the means. These results suggest an integration of the dual-process theory of moral judgment with construal-level theory.
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Cites
The Brain's Default Network: Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease
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The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
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Construal-level theory of psychological distance.
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The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
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Self-citationHow (and where) does moral judgment work?
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Self-citationAge differences in short-term retention of rapidly changing information.
Kirchner, W. K. (1958) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0043688 · Cited by 1,798
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545
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Self-citationProcessing emotional pictures and words: Effects of valence and arousal
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Pearson, J. (2019) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-019-0202-9 · Cited by 820
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Melnikoff, D. E., & Bargh, J. A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.02.001 · Cited by 377
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Metadata
- Authors
- Amit, E., & Greene, J. D.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-06-28
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 861-868
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2134751964
- Cited by
- 207
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 6.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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