Accurate Metacognition for Visual Sensory Memory Representations
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The capacity to attend to multiple objects in the visual field is limited. However, introspectively, people feel that they see the whole visual world at once. Some scholars suggest that this introspective feeling is based on short-lived sensory memory representations, whereas others argue that the feeling of seeing more than can be attended to is illusory. Here, we investigated this phenomenon by combining objective memory performance with subjective confidence ratings during a change-detection task. This allowed us to compute a measure of metacognition—the degree of knowledge that subjects have about the correctness of their decisions—for different stages of memory. We show that subjects store more objects in sensory memory than they can attend to but, at the same time, have similar metacognition for sensory memory and working memory representations. This suggests that these subjective impressions are not an illusion but accurate reflections of the richness of visual perception.
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Citations
Cites
The information available in brief visual presentations
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“By using a partial-report paradigm, one can distinguish between visual sensory memory (Neisser, 1967; Sperling, 1960) and visual working memory (Luck & Vogel, 1997).”
BackgroundMethodTowards a true neural stance on consciousness
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Self-citationConsciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
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Interactions between attention and working memory
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Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869 · cited 1×
“According to this view, the introspective feeling of seeing more than can be attended to is illusory, and high-capacity performance in partialreport experiments is based on implicit or unconscious information (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rahnev et al., 2011).”
BackgroundRelating Introspective Accuracy to Individual Differences in Brain Structure
Fleming, S. M., Weil, R. S., Nagy, Z., Dolan, R. J., & Rees, G. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1191883 · Cited by 809
Consciousness cannot be separated from function
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008 · Cited by 542
How conscious experience and working memory interact
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Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness
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How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2010) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588921003731586 · Cited by 487
Self-citationMeasuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches
Seth, A. K., Dienes, Z., Cleeremans, A., Overgaard, M., & Pessoa, L. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.008 · Cited by 458
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Spatial attention increases performance but not subjective confidence in a discrimination task
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Direct injection of noise to the visual cortex decreases accuracy but increases decision confidence
Rahnev, D. A., Maniscalco, B., Luber, B., Lau, H., & Lisanby, S. H. (2012) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.00985.2011 · Cited by 156
Measures of metacognition on signal-detection theoretic models
Barrett, A. B., Dienes, Z., & Seth, A. K. (2013) · Psychological Methods · doi:10.1037/a0033268 · Cited by 155 · cited 6×
“513, and therefore, the comparison between metacognition scores using AUC can be fully justified (Barrett et al., 2013).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
Jacobs, C., & Silvanto, J. (2015) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.06.003 · Cited by 42
Large Capacity of Conscious Access for Incidental Memories in Natural Scenes
Kaunitz, L. N., Rowe, E. G., & Tsuchiya, N. (2016) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797616658869 · Cited by 42
“FVSTM possesses a large capacity that subjects can metacognitively access (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014), similar to the incidental memory reported here.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialQianchen, L., Gallagher, R. M., & Tsuchiya, N. (2022) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.210394 · Cited by 21
Sustained conscious access to incidental memories in RSVP
Matthews, J., Wu, J., Corneille, V., Hohwy, J., van Boxtel, J., & Tsuchiya, N. (2019) · Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics · doi:10.3758/s13414-018-1600-1 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Vandenbroucke, A. R. E., Sligte, I. G., Barrett, A. B., Seth, A. K., Fahrenfort, J. J., & Lamme, V. A. F.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2014-02-18
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 861-873
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2116509392
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 2.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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