Cooperation for reputation: Wasteful contributions as costly signals in public goods
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why do people persistently contribute to public goods and does it matter to them if their donation makes a difference? A costly signalling perspective suggests that donors might be more concerned about their reputation than the utility of their helping act. We report data on two step-level public goods experiments. We find that in public (vs. private) conditions, contributions go up even when the public good is already provided (Experiment 1) or is unattainable (Experiment 2). Furthermore, these conspicuous donations appear to enhance the status and prestige of the donor because they signal some hidden quality. This research suggests that a public good contribution can be a self-presentation strategy and that the benefits of these contributions to society are sometimes of secondary importance.
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Citations
Cites
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010 · cited 1×
“Evolutionary-minded social scientists have come up with several viable accounts such as kin selection theory (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism theory (Trivers, 1971).”
BackgroundCialdini, R. B., Kallgren, C. A., & Reno, R. R. (1991) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60330-5 · Cited by 3,143
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700 · cited 1×
“…findings are broadly consistent with evolutionary models of reputation-based cooperation, inspired by costly signalling, such as competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998; Van Vugt et al., 2007) and indirect reciprocity (Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; see note 2).”
ResultCues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting
Bateson, M., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2006) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2006.0509 · Cited by 1,304
Nonverbal behavior and self-presentation.
DePaulo, B. M. (1992) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.111.2.203 · Cited by 890
Nice Guys Finish First: The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis
Hardy, C. L., & Van Vugt, M. (2006) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167206291006 · Cited by 836
Self-citationAltruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence
Millet, K., & Dewitte, S. (2007) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2006.04.002 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“A third explanation is that it provides information about a person’s intelligence—intelligent people behave more altruistically in economic games (Millet & Dewitte, 2007).”
Background
Cited by
The psychology of social dilemmas: A review
Van Lange, P. A. M., Joireman, J., Parks, C. D., & Van Dijk, E. (2013) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.11.003 · Cited by 763
Handbook of Heroism and Heroic Leadership
(2016) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315690100 · Cited by 418
Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans
Barclay, P. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.02.002 · Cited by 339
Griskevicius, V., Cantú, S. M., & van Vugt, M. (2012) · Journal of Public Policy & Marketing · doi:10.1509/jppm.11.040 · Cited by 329
Self-citationPreferences and beliefs in ingroup favoritism
Everett, J. A. C., Faber, N. S., & Crockett, M. (2015) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00015 · Cited by 282
Metadata
- Authors
- Van Vugt, M., & Hardy, C. L.
- Venue
- Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-11-13
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101-111
- ISSN
- 1368-4302 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7188
- OpenAlex
- W1982925713
- Cited by
- 145
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 10.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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