The DOI matches its Crossref record; 94 of the 94 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Person-Centered Approach to Moral Judgment
Abstract
Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.
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Crowdsourcing hypothesis tests: Making transparent how design choices shape research results.
Landy, J. F., Jia, M. (., Ding, I. L., Viganola, D., Tierney, W., Dreber, A., Johannesson, M., Pfeiffer, T., Ebersole, C. R., Gronau, Q. F., et al. (2020) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000220 · Cited by 168
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The neuroscience of moral cognition: from dual processes to dynamic systems
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Metadata
- Authors
- Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., & Diermeier, D.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-01
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 72-81
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2126278216
- Cited by
- 390
- References
- 94
- FWCI
- 18.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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