The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories
Abstract
Conspiracy theories can form a monological belief system: A self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually supportive beliefs. The present research shows that even mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated in endorsement. In Study 1 ( n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 ( n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive. Hierarchical regression models showed that mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that the authorities are engaged in a cover-up (Study 2). The monological nature of conspiracy belief appears to be driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another but by broader beliefs supporting conspiracy theories in general.
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“This is consistent with findings that participants who believed in one conspiracy theory were also more likely to believe in others, even when they were contradictory [42,43].”
From The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories (2020) · cites this paper as [42]
In the citing paper
“the simultaneous belief in mutually contradictory theories—e.g., that Princess Diana was murdered but faked her own death—is a notable aspect of conspiracist ideation [30]”
From The Role of Conspiracist Ideation and Worldviews in Predicting Rejection of Science (2013) · cites this paper as [30]
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511
“For example, Wood et al. (2012) showed that the positive correlation between mutually contradictory conspiracy beliefs (e.g., that Princess Diana was murdered or that she faked her own death and is still alive) was no longer significant when participants’ level of agreement that there was a…”
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Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721417718261 · Cited by 1,316
Self-citationThe Effects of Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions
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Self-citationConspiracy theories as barriers to controlling the spread of COVID-19 in the U.S.
Römer, D., & Jamieson, K. H. (2020) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113356 · Cited by 1,065
“Another reason for the robustness of conspiracy theories is the tolerance that those who hold them have for inconsistency (Douglas et al., 2019; Miller, 2020; Wood et al., 2012).”
BackgroundMeasuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale
Brotherton, R., French, C. C., & Pickering, A. D. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279 · Cited by 950
Metadata
- Authors
- Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M.
- Affiliations
- University of Kent (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Wood, Michael J.
- Venue
- Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-01-25
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 767-773
- ISSN
- 1948-5506 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-5514
- OpenAlex
- W2133598673
- Cited by
- 660
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 52 · 2024: 67 · 2023: 60 · 2022: 90 · 2021: 96 · 2020: 60 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 72.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Social Psychological and Personality Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, belief endorsement, cover-up, Princess Diana, Osama bin Laden, Bayesian networks, conspiracy beliefs
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