The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Religiosity, Political Orientation, and Consequentialist Moral Thinking
Abstract
Three studies demonstrated that the moral judgments of religious individuals and political conservatives are highly insensitive to consequentialist (i.e., outcome-based) considerations. In Study 1, both religiosity and political conservatism predicted a resistance toward consequentialist thinking concerning a range of transgressive acts, independent of other relevant dispositional factors (e.g., disgust sensitivity). Study 2 ruled out differences in welfare sensitivity as an explanation for these findings. In Study 3, religiosity and political conservatism predicted a commitment to judging “harmless” taboo violations morally impermissible, rather than discretionary, despite the lack of negative consequences rising from the act. Furthermore, non-consequentialist thinking style was shown to mediate the relationship religiosity/conservatism had with impermissibility judgments, while intuitive thinking style did not. These data provide further evidence for the influence of religious and political commitments in motivating divergent moral judgments, while highlighting a new dispositional factor, non-consequentialist thinking style, as a mediator of these effects.
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“Multiple studies suggest that religious disbelief is associated with a more consequentialist view of morality. Specifically, disbelievers are more inclined to judge the appropriateness of actions based on their consequences relative to the consequences of inaction [57–59].”
From The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality (2021) · cites this paper as [59]
In the citing paper
“The moral psychology literature also suggests that disbelievers are more inclined than believers to form moral judgments on the basis of the consequences of specific actions compared to inaction [57–59].”
From The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality (2021) · cites this paper as [59]
Citations
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“These findings extend past findings by Piazza (2012). Piazza’s studies focused on religiosity and provided participants with the option of justifying their condemnation for various acts, along a continuum, by either appealing to the violation of a rule or a negative consequence. Measures of religiosity were found to u…”
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Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434
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Is the cognitive reflection test a measure of both reflection and intuition?
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-015-0576-1 · Cited by 281
Metadata
- Authors
- Piazza, J., & Sousa, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Queen's University Belfast (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Piazza, Jared
- Venue
- Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-06-13
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 334-342
- ISSN
- 1948-5506 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-5514
- OpenAlex
- W2100942092
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 3
- FWCI
- 4.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Social Psychological and Personality Science (publishedVersion)
- Lancaster EPrints (Lancaster University) (submittedVersion)
- Research Portal (Queen's University Belfast) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Keywords
- religiosity, political conservatism, moral judgment, taboo violation, disgust sensitivity, intuitive thinking, moral transgression
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