Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next)
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders.
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Citations
Cites
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Background
Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Self-citationThe threshold for conscious report: Signal loss and response bias in visual and frontal cortex
van Vugt, B., Dagnino, B., Vartak, D., Safaai, H., Panzeri, S., Dehaene, S., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aar7186 · Cited by 394
Unpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections
Mudrik, L., Boly, M., Dehaene, S., Fleming, S. M., Lamme, V., Seth, A., & Melloni, L. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106053 · Cited by 81
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“Phenomenal consciousness—the ‘what-it-is-like’ (Nagel 1974) to experience—has now been an area of serious scientific study for at least 30 years (Seth 2018).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Seth, A. K.
- Venue
- Brain and Neuroscience Advances
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2018-01
- Volume
- 2
- Pages
- 2398212818816019-2398212818816019
- ISSN
- 2398-2128 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2900852212
- Cited by
- 126
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 10.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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