Cited by 559Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesVisual perception and processing mechanisms

Are the neural correlates of consciousness in the front or in the back of the cerebral cortex? Clinical and neuroimaging evidence

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Boly, Melanie, Massimini, Marcello, Tsuchiya, Naotsugu, Postle, Bradley R., Koch, Christof, Tononi, Giulio·2017·The Journal of Neuroscience

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Abstract

The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate. In this Perspective, we will critically review the clinical and neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the front versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss promising research avenues. Dual Perspectives Companion Paper: Should a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?, by Brian Odegaard, Robert T. Knight, and Hakwan Lau

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1523/jneurosci.3218-16.2017

Cites

128 of 128 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice organization of posterior cortex makes it a plausible candidate for the substrate of human consciousness.

    “In the brain, a large part of the cerebral cortex, especially its posterior regions, is organized as a dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice of specialized units, which makes it a plausible candidate for the substrate of human consciousness [4, 11, 51, 52].”

    From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [51]

    The Forward inference passage (under Stimulation studies; page unavailable) identifies a posterior parieto-occipital “hot zone” as a reliable neural correlate of consciousness, supporting the idea that posterior cortex is a plausible candidate. Our copy does not describe a dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice or attribute that structural rationale to posterior cortex. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In the brain, a large part of the cerebral cortex, especially its posterior regions, is organized as a dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice of specialized units.

    “In the brain, a large part of the cerebral cortex, especially its posterior regions, is organized as a dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice of specialized units, which makes it a plausible candidate for the substrate of human consciousness [4, 11, 51, 52].”

    From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [51]

    The Introduction identifies posterior parietal, occipital, and lateral temporal cortex as the paper’s proposed ‘back’ of the brain, and the section on reverse inference reports that specific conscious contents are most consistently associated with posterior cortex. Our copy does not describe the cortex as a dense, divergent-convergent hierarchical 3D lattice of specialized units, so the structural part of the claim is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • IIT holds that a maximal Φ value will be reached primarily in posterior cortex (hot zone) when dense reentrant interactions occur between higher and lower visual areas.

    “IIT holds that a maximal F value will be reached primarily in posterior cortex (''hot zone'') 78,95 when dense reentrant interactions occur between higher and lower visual areas.7”

    From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [78]

    The Conclusion and future directions section identifies a posterior cortical “hot zone” as important for the contents of consciousness, and the discussion of within-state studies places it in parieto-occipital cortex. Those passages support the location cited here, but they do not establish that IIT’s maximal Φ is reached there; the sentence cites a different source for the reentrant-interaction condition. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • IIT identifies a posterior hot zone, which has been stipulated to represent a maximum of phi in the brain, and potentially also a source of spatial phenomenology, due to its organization as a hierarchy of 2D grids.

    “With respect to the neural substrates of consciousness, IIT identifies a “posterior hot zone” (Boly et al., 2017), which has been stipulated to represent a maximum of phi in the brain (Boly et al., 2017), and potentially also a source of spatial phenomenology, due to its organization as a hierarchy of 2D grids (Haun and Tononi, 2019).”

    From An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as Boly et al., 2017

    The Stimulation studies section (page unavailable) describes a posterior parieto-occipital “hot zone” as a reliable neural correlate of consciousness. The passages found do not say that IIT identifies it or that it represents a maximum of phi in the brain. The separate claim about spatial phenomenology is cited to Haun and Tononi (2019), not to this source. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Current methods in human neuroscience are almost exclusively correlational and seem unable to resolve the controversy over whether the PFC plays an essential role in consciousness.

    “Whether or not the PFC plays an essential role in consciousness therefore remains intensely debated, and current methods in human neuroscience, which are almost exclusively correlational in nature, seem unable to resolve the controversy (Boly et al., 2017;Odegaard et al., 2017).”

    From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as Boly et al., 2017

    The Introduction says the frontal cortex’s involvement in consciousness remains a matter of debate. But the Lesion studies and Stimulation studies sections describe causal evidence from lesions and direct evidence from electrical stimulation, so the paper does not support the characterization of human neuroscience methods as almost exclusively correlational or unable to inform the debate. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. SiclariF,LaRocqueJJ,BernardiG,PostleBR,TononiG (2014) Theneuralcorrelates of consciousness in sleep: a no-task, within-state paradigm. BioRXiv. Available at: http://www.biorxiv.org/content/early/2014/12/30/012443.

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Authors
Boly, M., Massimini, M., Tsuchiya, N., Postle, B. R., Koch, C., & Tononi, G.
Affiliations
  • University of Milan (IT)
  • Monash University (AU)
  • University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
Corresponding author
Tononi, Giulio
Venue
The Journal of Neuroscience
Published
2017-10-04
Volume
37
Issue
40
Pages
9603-9613
ISSN
  • 0270-6474 (ISSN-L)
  • 1529-2401
OpenAlex
W2952447148
Cited by
557
References
127
Citations by year
2026: 36 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 80 · 2023: 75 · 2022: 61 · 2021: 67 · 2020: 78 · 2019: 61 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 6
FWCI
7.69
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Neuroscience (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Archivio Istituzionale della Ricerca (Universita Degli Studi Di Milano) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • Tiny Blue Dot Foundation
  • Templeton World Charity Foundation
  • National Institutes of Health (H2020, MH095984)
  • Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (686764, -2014-2015, H2020-FETOPEN-2014-2015- RIA)
  • National Institute of Mental Health (R01MH064498, R01MH095984)
  • National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (R03NS096379)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Keywords
neural correlates of consciousness, frontal cortex, posterior cortex, prefrontal cortex, conscious perception, visual awareness
MeSH terms
Animals, Brain Mapping, Cerebral Cortex, Consciousness, Humans, Nerve Net, Neuroimaging

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