Cited by 100Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of SciencePhenomenology and Existential Philosophy

Processes, Acts, and Experiences: Three Stances on the Problem of Intentionality

Shaw, Robert·2001·Ecological Psychology

Abstract

The concept of intentionality addresses "aboutness," how one thing can be about, or refer to, some other thing. The argument I present in this article is that intentionality is an essential ecological concept that depends equally on process (the domain of physics), act (the domain of biology), and experience (the domain of psychology). The meaning of intentionality does not reside in any 1 of these realms, but rests simultaneously on all 3. A case is made for intentionality being rooted in a ubiquitous cosmological scheme that underwrites all systems no less than does the universal causality scheme.

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Crossref · 10.1207/s15326969eco1304_02

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34 of 34 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • On more ambitious physical proposals, the availability of specific affordances depends on circumstances, while their bare possibility is given with the laws of nature.

    “On more ambitious proposals, the availability of specific affordances depends on specific circumstances (i.e. initial conditions etc.), but their "bare possibility" is given with the laws of nature (Shaw, 2001;Turvey, 1992, see also Shaw et al., 2019).”

    From Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology. (2024) · cites this paper as Shaw, 2001

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Authors
Shaw, R.
Affiliations
University of Connecticut (US)
Corresponding author
Shaw, Robert
Venue
Ecological Psychology
Published
2001-10
Volume
13
Issue
4
Pages
275-314
ISSN
  • 1040-7413 (ISSN-L)
  • 1532-6969
OpenAlex
W2095224598
Cited by
100
References
42
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 7
FWCI
5.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Ecological Psychology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Keywords
intentionality, aboutness, process, ACT, experience, cosmology

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