The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
Open accessAbstract
Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999).
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
Self-citationConceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Balog, K. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998286 · Cited by 242 · cited 1×
“31 Among type-B materialists, Balog 1999 and Loar 1997 (and possibly others) accept that psychophysical necessities may be sui generis in this way. Balog 1999 argues that reasoning from an epistemic gap to an ontological gap is invalid, since a zombie (a physical duplicate of a conscious being, without consciousness)…”
Result
Cited by
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction
Rosen, G. (2010) · Modality · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007 · Cited by 1,285
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Self-citationdeRosset, L. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9538-8 · Cited by 155
Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
Chalmers, D. J. (2011) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzr046 · Cited by 113
Self-citationReal Acquaintance and Physicalism
Goff, P. (2015) · Phenomenal Qualities · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005 · Cited by 79
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J., & Jackson, F.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2001-07-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 315-360
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2133205096
- Cited by
- 691
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 7.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
