Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources used for the online guidance of visuomotor action, on the other. This “dual visual systems” hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of conscious visual experience.
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Cites
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
Bornstein, M. H., & Gibson, J. J. (1980) · The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism · doi:10.2307/429816 · Cited by 22,935
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition
Gibson, J. J. (2014) · doi:10.4324/9781315740218 · Cited by 12,132
Distributed hierarchical processing in the primate cerebral cortex
Felleman, D. J., & Van Essen, D. C. (1991) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/1.1.1 · Cited by 7,783
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126
Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (1997) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(97)01080-2 · Cited by 1,039
Cited by
Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (2008) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.10.005 · Cited by 1,514
Neural evidence for the interplay between language, gesture, and action: A review
Willems, R. M., & Hagoort, P. (2007) · Brain and Language · doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2007.03.004 · Cited by 393
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333
Ways of Seeing: The scope and limits of visual cognition
Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198509219.001.0001 · Cited by 297
Metadata
- Authors
- Clark, A.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2001-10-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 495-519
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2129358906
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 8.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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