The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Abstract
This paper introduces a three-item “Cognitive Reflection Test” (CRT) as a simple measure of one type of cognitive ability—the ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind. The author will show that CRT scores are predictive of the types of choices that feature prominently in tests of decision-making theories, like expected utility theory and prospect theory. Indeed, the relation is sometimes so strong that the preferences themselves effectively function as expressions of cognitive ability—an empirical fact begging for a theoretical explanation. The author examines the relation between CRT scores and two important decision-making characteristics: time preference and risk preference. The CRT scores are then compared with other measures of cognitive ability or cognitive “style.” The CRT scores exhibit considerable difference between men and women and the article explores how this relates to sex differences in time and risk preferences. The final section addresses the interpretation of correlations between cognitive abilities and decision-making characteristics.
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In the citing paper
“we find the participants’ accuracy increased by 2.1 percentage points (z(16002) = 4.6, β = 2.1, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.2, 3.0]) for each of the three Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)73 questions they answered correctly.”
From Human detection of political speech deepfakes across transcripts, audio, and video (2024) · cites this paper as [73]
In the citing paper
“To assess metacognitive bias, the present study employed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), a measure of reflective reasoning and the ability to override intuitive, automatic responses.”
From “ ChatGPT can make mistakes. Check important info.” Epistemic beliefs and metacognitive accuracy in students' integration of ChatGPT content into academic writing (2025) · cites this paper as Frederick, 2005
In the citing paper
“we also included the following measures as covariates, which research has shown are associated with susceptibility to misinformation:”
From Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media (2022) · cites this paper as [38]
In the citing paper
“Frederick (2005) found that large numbers of highly select university students at MIT, Princeton, and Harvard were cognitive misers; they responded that the cost was 10 cents, rather than the correct answer... 5 cents.”
From The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011) · cites this paper as Frederick, 2005
In the citing paper
“The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response.”
From The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011) · cites this paper as Frederick, 2005
In the citing paper
“Frederick (2005) observed that with as few as three items, his CRT could predict performance on measures of temporal discounting, the tendency to choose high-expected-value gambles, and framing effects.”
From The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011) · cites this paper as Frederick, 2005
In the citing paper
“Frederick (2005) reported a correlation of .44 between CRT performance and SAT total scores, as well as a .43correlation between CRT scores and performance on the Wonderlic IQ test.”
From The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011) · cites this paper as Frederick, 2005
Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D. J., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,720
Anderson, N. H. (2001) · Psychology Press eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781410600004-24 · Cited by 6,939
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205102320161311 · Cited by 6,106
Self-citation(1999) · Cited by 6,104
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116 · Cited by 5,359
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 4,481
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.
Sloman, S. A. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3 · Cited by 3,942
Gender differences in risk taking: a meta-analysis
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.3.367 · Cited by 3,723
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Becker Gary, 1977, American Economic Review., 67, 76
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/a0016755 · Cited by 2,443
The trouble with overconfidence.
Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.115.2.502 · Cited by 2,358
Data collection in a flat world: the strengths and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples
Goodman, J. K., Cryder, C. E., & Cheema, A. (2013) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.1753 · Cited by 2,242
Managerial cognitive capabilities and the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities
Helfat, C. E., & Peteraf, M. A. (2015) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2247 · Cited by 2,056
Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797620939054 · Cited by 1,715
Metadata
- Authors
- Frederick, S.
- Affiliations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Frederick, Shane
- ORCID
- Frederick, Shane
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-11-01
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 25-42
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2161080627
- Cited by
- 5,256
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 317 · 2025: 394 · 2024: 420 · 2023: 455 · 2022: 415 · 2021: 459 · 2020: 392 · 2019: 380 · 2018: 309 · 2017: 320 · 2016: 266 · 2015: 287 · 2014: 195 · 2013: 176 · 2012: 136
- FWCI
- 22.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Keywords
- cognitive reflection, Cognitive Reflection Test, decision-making, expected utility theory, prospect theory, time preference, risk preferences, cognitive ability, sex differences, cognitive style
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