The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We review evidence from our published and ongoing research that disclosing conflicts of interest has unintended consequences, helping conflicted advisors and harming their advisees: With disclosure, advisors feel comfortable giving more biased advice, but advisees do not properly adjust for this and generally fail to sufficiently discount biased advice. Disclosure also increases pressure on advisees to comply with advice; following disclosure, advisees feel more uncomfortable in turning down advice (e.g., it signals distrust of the advisor's motives). Finally, we examine the effectiveness of policy interventions aimed at reducing these unintended consequences and discuss how to realize potential benefits of disclosure.
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Cites
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“Research has identified a number of factors that determine whether product safety disclosures have intended or unintended consequences (see Fung, Graham, and Weil 2007).”
BackgroundWhat you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
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Self-citationAccounting in Organizations and Society
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Cited by
LEUZ, C., & WYSOCKI, P. D. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12115 · Cited by 1,760
The Unintended Consequences of Conflict of Interest Disclosure
Loewenstein, G., Sah, S., & Cain, D. M. (2012) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.2012.154 · Cited by 252
Self-citationDunn, A. G., Coiera, E., Mandl, K. D., & Bourgeois, F. T. (2016) · Research Integrity and Peer Review · doi:10.1186/s41073-016-0006-7 · Cited by 208
“including increasing their trust or making them dismissive of the material [46, 47].”
BackgroundToward a framework for public accountability in education reform
Hutt, E., & Polikoff, M. S. (2020) · Educational Researcher · doi:10.3102/0013189x20931246 · Cited by 20
“…capacity for change (Fenster, 2017; Schudson, 2015); misperceive the value of information in people’s decision-making (Ben-Shahar & Schneider, 2014; Loewenstein et al., 2011); overestimate the relationship between information and political action (Ruppert, 2015); and reflect a distinct…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Loewenstein, G., Cain, D. M., & Sah, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-05-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 423-428
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1995485365
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 10.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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