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Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort Experiment
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between relative earnings and giving in a two-stage, real-effort experiment. In the first stage, four players compete in a tournament that determines their earnings. In the second stage, they decide whether to make a transfer to one or more of their group members. Our main finding is that those ranked first are significantly less likely to give than those ranked second. This difference disappears if individuals learn about the second stage after earning their income or if earnings are randomly determined. This suggests that our main finding is driven by selection based on other-regarding preferences. JEL: D64, J31
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“Experiment I In Experiment I, each subject was given 10 minutes to work on two real-effort tasks: the slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2012) and the encryption task (Erkal et al., 2011).”
MethodSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Erkal, N., Gangadharan, L., & Nikiforakis, N.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-12-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3330-3348
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2062527093
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 25.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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