The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard
Open accessAbstract
Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding's after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard. (JEL D21, D81, D82, D86, G32, L26)
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Cites
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Cited by
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Digital Tulips? Returns to investors in initial coin offerings
Benedetti, H., & Kostovetsky, L. (2021) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101786 · Cited by 302
OM Forum—Innovative Online Platforms: Research Opportunities
Chen, Y.-J., Dai, T., Korpeoglu, C. G., Körpeoğlu, E., Sahin, O., Tang, C. S., & Xiao, S. (2020) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2018.0757 · Cited by 226
Platform Tokenization: Financing, Governance, and Moral Hazard
Chod, J., Trichakis, N., & Yang, S. A. (2022) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4225 · Cited by 134
Innovative Online Platforms: Research Opportunities
Chen, Y.-J., Dai, T., Korpeoglu, C. G., Körpeoğlu, E., Sahin, O., Tang, C. S., & Xiao, S. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3098921 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Strausz, R.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2017-06-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1430-1476
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2219244669
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 61.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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