Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We measure the persuasive effects of slanted news and tastes for like-minded news, exploiting cable channel positions as exogenous shifters of cable news viewership. Channel positions do not correlate with demographics that predict viewership and voting, nor with local satellite viewership. We estimate that Fox News increases Republican vote shares by 0.3 points among viewers induced into watching 2.5 additional minutes per week by variation in position. We then estimate a model of voters who select into watching slanted news, and whose ideologies evolve as a result. We use the model to assess the growth over time of Fox News influence, to quantitatively assess media-driven polarization, and to simulate alternative ideological slanting of news channels. (JEL D72, L82)
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In the citing paper
“These trends are also reflected in, and amplified by, popular media (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Levendusky 2013; Martin and Yurukoglu 2017).”
From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Martin and Yurukoglu 2017
In the citing paper
“Based on the documented connection between Fox News and conservative politics (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Martin and Yurukoglu 2017), we use viewership of the channel as an indication of household demand for partisan media content.”
From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Martin and Yurukoglu 2017
In the citing paper
“In a break with long-standing convention in network TV programming, Fox News, since its launch in 1996, has openly supported Republican politicians and viewpoints and opposed Democratic ones.”
From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Martin and Yurukoglu 2017
In the citing paper
“Exposure to ideologically driven networks (such as Fox News on the political right and MSNBC on the political left) exerts both persuasive245,246 and reinforcement effects247.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [246]
In the citing paper
“The rise of cable television and the 1987 repeal of the Federal Communication Commission's fairness doctrine set into motion an increasing polarization of news (91).”
From Misinformation in and about science (2021) · cites this paper as [91]
Citations
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Cited by
Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure
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“6 The most closely related is the important paper by Mosquera et al. (2018), which was made public the month before ours.”
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“Utilizing the channel positioning of Fox News as an instrumental variable, combined with a rich source of data on Nielsen viewership ratings, Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) show that ideological TV channels—such as Fox—can drastically shape political references.”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Martin, G. J., & Yurukoglu, A.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305, and NBER (email: )
- ORCID
- Martin, Gregory J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2017-09-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 2565-2599
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1498571457
- Cited by
- 666
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 64 · 2024: 123 · 2023: 65 · 2022: 72 · 2021: 83 · 2020: 91 · 2019: 81 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 7
- FWCI
- 151.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Communication › News Media Framing and Political Communication
- Keywords
- cable news, Fox News, media bias, persuasion, political polarization, news selection, voting behavior, Republican vote share, media influence
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