The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
Abstract
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of “core convergence” result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process. (JEL C78, B41, J44)
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Citations
Cites
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
Kamecke, U., Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1992) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554894 · Cited by 1,625
Self-citationThe evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261272 · Cited by 1,219
Self-citationThe Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.7.4.617 · Cited by 895
Self-citationMcMillan, J. (1994) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.3.145 · Cited by 699
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.1.159 · Cited by 530
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Roth, A. E. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1 · Cited by 466
Self-citationRandom Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
Roth, A. E., & Vate, J. H. V. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938326 · Cited by 353
Self-citationOn the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets
Roth, A. E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913160 · Cited by 347
Self-citationMacro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society's Largest Economic Risks.
Bliss, C., & Shiller, R. J. (1995) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235141 · Cited by 347
Roth, A. E. (1991) · PubMed · Cited by 343
Self-citationJumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions
Roth, A. E., & Xing, X. (1994) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) · Cited by 343
Self-citationKagel, J. H., & Roth, A. E. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554719 · Cited by 220
Self-citationExperiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms
Ledyard, J. O., Porter, D., & Rangel, A. (1997) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00639.x · Cited by 177
Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets-in Search of Advice for Participants
Roth, A. E., & Rothblum, U. G. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00002 · Cited by 175
Self-citationManipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Sönmez, T. (1997) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2316 · Cited by 154
The College Admissions Problem Revisited
Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, J. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911052 · Cited by 153
Self-citationNew physicians: A natural experiment in market organization
Roth, A. E. (1990) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2274783 · Cited by 141
Self-citationVacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets
Blum, Y., Roth, A. E., & Rothblum, U. G. (1997) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2307 · Cited by 116
Self-citationThe Effects of the Change in the NRMP Matching Algorithm
Roth, A. E. (1997) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.1997.03550090053032 · Cited by 100
Self-citationA further note on the stable matching problem
Demange, G., Gale, D., & Sotomayor, J. (1987) · Discrete Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/0166-218x(87)90059-x · Cited by 82
Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
Roth, A. E., & Vate, J. H. V. (1991) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01210572 · Cited by 80
Self-citationCan Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?
Sönmez, T. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2507 · Cited by 71
House Allocation with Transfers
Miyagawa, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2703 · Cited by 56
Aldershof, B. K., & Carducci, O. M. (1996) · Discrete Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/0166-218x(96)89151-7 · Cited by 34
A reexamination of the NRMP matching algorithm. National Resident Matching Program
Williams, K. J. (1995) · Academic Medicine · doi:10.1097/00001888-199506000-00007 · Cited by 29
The NRMP matching algorithm revisited
Peranson, E., & Randlett, R. R. (1995) · Academic Medicine · doi:10.1097/00001888-199506000-00008 · Cited by 24
Self-citation
Cited by
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
Self-citationRoth, A. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344632 · Cited by 964
Self-citationHatfield, J. W., & Milgrom, P. R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825466 · Cited by 788
The New York City High School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774670167 · Cited by 654
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E., & Peranson, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-09-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 748-780
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W3123388428
- Cited by
- 756
- References
- 28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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