The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
Abstract
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of “core convergence” result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process. (JEL C78, B41, J44)
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Cites
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Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
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Self-citationThe evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
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Self-citationThe Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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Self-citationMcMillan, J. (1994) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.3.145 · Cited by 699
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
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The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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Self-citationRandom Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
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Self-citationOn the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Self-citation
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
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Self-citationRoth, A. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344632 · Cited by 964
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The New York City High School Match
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Self-citationThe Methodology of Experimental Economics
Guala, F. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614651 · Cited by 582
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
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Self-citationRoth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M. (2005) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004 · Cited by 536
Self-citationAlgorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
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Self-citationDeferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
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Self-citationEfficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
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Self-citationWhat Have We Learned from Market Design?
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Self-citationDeferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
Roth, A. E. (2008) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6 · Cited by 372
Self-citationIncentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Kojima, F., & Pathak, P. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.608 · Cited by 362
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
Pathak, P. A., & Sönmez, T. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.4.1636 · Cited by 346
Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets.
Cheung, S. L. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.13915 · Cited by 336
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
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A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
Azevedo, E. M., & Leshno, J. D. (2016) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/687476 · Cited by 312
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Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
Ergin, H., & Sönmez, T. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002 · Cited by 305
The Nash equilibrium: A perspective
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Self-citationStability in Supply Chain Networks
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Core-selecting package auctions
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Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges
Saidman, S. L., Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., Ünver, M. U., & Delmonico, F. L. (2006) · Transplantation · doi:10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25 · Cited by 263
Self-citationThe Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard
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Kesten, O. (2010) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297 · Cited by 255
Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
Baswana, S., Chakrabarti, P. P., Chandran, S., Kanoria, Y., & Patange, U. (2019) · INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics · doi:10.1287/inte.2019.1007 · Cited by 41
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E., & Peranson, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-09-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 748-780
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W3123388428
- Cited by
- 756
- References
- 28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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