The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market
Abstract
This article presents an empirical study of market power in the British electricity industry. Estimates of price-cost markups are derived using direct measures of marginal cost and several approaches that do not rely on cost data. Since two suppliers facing inelastic demand dominate the industry, most oligopoly models predict prices substantially above marginal costs. All estimates indicate that prices, while higher than marginal costs, are not nearly as high as most theoretical models predict. Regulatory constraints, the threat of entry, and financial contracts between the suppliers and their customers are considered as possible explanations for the observed price levels. (JEL L13, L94)
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Klemperer, P. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027166 · Cited by 977
Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. B., & Wolak, F. A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024557 · Cited by 941
Equilibrium Pricing and Optimal Hedging in Electricity Forward Markets
Bessembinder, H., & Lemmon, M. L. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00463 · Cited by 723
A New Way to Measure Competition
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Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization
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Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks
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“The techniques used to compute engineering estimates of marginal input costs are similar to those in Wolfram (1999) and Borenstein et al. (2002), among others.”
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An empirical examination of restructured electricity prices
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Self-citationConduct parameters and the measurement of market power
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Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics
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California's Electricity Crisis
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Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market
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Power to Choose? An Analysis of Consumer Inertia in the Residential Electricity Market
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Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage
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Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden
Lundin, E. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2743221 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Wolfram, C. D.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-09-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 805-826
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2067478551
- Cited by
- 743
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 52.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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