The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
Abstract
We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the second-highest effort wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. The contest's designer maximizes expected effort. When cost functions are linear or concave in effort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single “first” prize. When cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal. (JEL D44, J31, D72, D82)
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Cited by
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The Economic Design of Sporting Contests
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
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Metadata
- Authors
- Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-06-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 542-558
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2043634452
- Cited by
- 860
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 21.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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