The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
Abstract
We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the second-highest effort wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. The contest's designer maximizes expected effort. When cost functions are linear or concave in effort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single “first” prize. When cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal. (JEL D44, J31, D72, D82)
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Cites
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Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving
Terwiesch, C., & Xu, Y. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0884 · Cited by 923
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis
Boudreau, K. J., Lacetera, N., & Lakhani, K. R. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1322 · Cited by 830
The Economic Design of Sporting Contests
Szymanski, S. (2010) · The Comparative Economics of Sport · doi:10.1057/9780230274273_1 · Cited by 676
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Optimal Design of Research Contests
Che, Y.-K., & Gale, I. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157025 · Cited by 428
Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars
Brown, J. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/663306 · Cited by 380
Ostrovsky, M., Schwarz, M., & Edelman, B. G. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.861164 · Cited by 333
Tournaments in Mutual-Fund Families
Kempf, A., & Ruenzi, S. (2008) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm057 · Cited by 299
Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001 · Cited by 297
Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions
DiPalantino, D., & Vojnovic, M. (2009) · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1566374.1566392 · Cited by 292
Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking
Hvide, H. K. (2002) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/342041 · Cited by 277
Moldovanu, B., Sela, A., & Shi, X. (2007) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/518010 · Cited by 277
Self-citationKonrad, K. A., & Kovenock, D. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.002 · Cited by 264
Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study
Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.006 · Cited by 257
The theory of contests: a survey
Corchón, L. C. (2007) · Review of Economic Design · doi:10.1007/s10058-007-0032-5 · Cited by 253
Mechanism Design for An Incentive-aware Blockchain-enabled Federated Learning Platform
Toyoda, K., & Zhang, A. N. (2019) · 2019 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data) · doi:10.1109/bigdata47090.2019.9006344 · Cited by 118
Field Evidence on Individual Behavior & Performance in Rank-Order Tournaments
Boudreau, K. J., Helfat, C. E., Lakhani, K. R., & Menietti, M. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2127310 · Cited by 24
All pay auctions and group size: Grading on a curve and other applications
Andreoni, J., & Brownback, A. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.017 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-06-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 542-558
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2043634452
- Cited by
- 860
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 21.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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