The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Abstract
As the Indonesian economy went into a downward spiral in the latter half of 1997, there was much speculation and debate as to the reasons behind the sudden decline. Most explanations gave at least some role to investor panic, which had led to a massive outflow of foreign capital. At the root of this hysteria, however, were concerns that the capital that had flowed into Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia had not been used for productive investments. Much of this discussion focused on the role of political connections in driving investment. The claim was that in Southeast Asia, political connectedness, rather than fundamentals such as productivity, was the primary determinant of profitability and that this had led to distorted investment decisions. Obviously, the degree to which this type of problem was truly responsible for the Asian collapse depends very much on the extent to which connectedness really was a primary determinant of firm value. In making the argument that this was in fact the case, anecdotes about the business dealings of President Suharto’s children were often cited as evidence. Such stories suggest that the value of some firms may have been highly dependent on their political connections. However, investigations in this area have not progressed beyond the level of case study and anecdote. That is, there has been no attempt to estimate the degree to which firms rely on connections for their profitability. There are numerous difficulties that would
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“However, we stress that returns to top owner-managers need not be socially optimal and can include returns to unproductive behavior like rentseeking (Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991) or returns to elite connections (Fisman, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Zimmerman, forthcoming).”
From “Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century” (2019) · cites this paper as Fisman, 2001
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
Krueger, A. O. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_8 · Cited by 5,272
Moffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
Leff, N. H. (1964) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276426400800303 · Cited by 2,568
Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia
Fan, J. P. H., & Wong, T. J. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00047-2 · Cited by 1,918
Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia
Johnson, S., & Mitton, T. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00255-6 · Cited by 1,565
Lemmon, M. L., & Lins, K. V. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00573 · Cited by 1,339
Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey
Claessens, S., & Fan, J. P. H. (2002) · International Review of Finance · doi:10.1111/1468-2443.00034 · Cited by 959
Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating
Jacob, B. A., & Levitt, S. D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360698441 · Cited by 878
Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities laws?
Siegel, J. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.02.001 · Cited by 614
Cited by
Items 101–136 of 136
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Brown, C. O., & Dinc, I. S. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097506 · Cited by 335
Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities
Dal Bó, E., & Rossi, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.005 · Cited by 335
Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance
Butler, A. W., Fauver, L., & Mortal, S. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp010 · Cited by 334
Buffering and enabling: The impact of interlocking political ties on firm survival and sales growth
Zheng, W., Singh, K., & Mitchell, W. (2015) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2301 · Cited by 330
How Network Strategies and Institutional Transitions Evolve in Asia
Peng, M. W., & Zhou, J. Q. (2005) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-005-4113-0 · Cited by 330
Political Connections and Allocative Distortions
SCHOENHERR, D. (2019) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12751 · Cited by 328
High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world
Chen, C. J., Ding, Y., & Kim, C. (2010) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2010.27 · Cited by 326
MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics
EGGERS, A. C., & HAINMUELLER, J. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990190 · Cited by 318
“This is consistent with evidence from several other countries, suggesting that employing sitting or former politicians as board directors, consultants, or executives is valuable to firms precisely because of the political connections and knowledge that politicians possess (Faccio 2006; Ferguson and Voth 2008; Fisman 2…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialAuditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms
GUEDHAMI, O., PITTMAN, J. A., & SAFFAR, W. (2014) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12032 · Cited by 318
Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the Outcome One Studies Affects the Answer One Gets
Kramon, E., & Posner, D. N. (2013) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592713001035 · Cited by 317
Jayachandran, S. (2006) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/501091 · Cited by 316
Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?
Aggarwal, R. K., Meschke, F., & Wang, T. Y. (2012) · Business and Politics · doi:10.1515/1469-3569.1391 · Cited by 311
The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors
Tahoun, A. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.008 · Cited by 310
Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence From Malaysia
Johnson, S. H., & Mitton, T. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.281961 · Cited by 302
Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?
Cohen, L., Coval, J., & Malloy, C. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/664820 · Cited by 302
Envirodevonomics: A Research Agenda for an Emerging Field
Greenstone, M., & Jack, B. K. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.1.5 · Cited by 300
State Ownership and Political Connections
Tihanyi, L., Aguilera, R. V., Heugens, P., van Essen, M., Sauerwald, S., Duran, P., & Turturea, R. (2019) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206318822113 · Cited by 299
Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections
Snowberg, E., Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.2.807 · Cited by 290
Big Business Owners in Politics
Bunkanwanicha, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn083 · Cited by 285
Kim, C. (., Pantzalis, C., & Chul Park, J. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.007 · Cited by 281
Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating
Jacob, B., & Levitt, S. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9413 · Cited by 279
Sidki Darendeli, I., & Hill, T. L. (2016) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2015.27 · Cited by 276
Importing corruption culture from overseas: Evidence from corporate tax evasion in the United States
DeBacker, J., Heim, B. T., & Tran, A. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.009 · Cited by 273
Lemmon, M. L., & Lins, K. V. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.265108 · Cited by 271
Clarke, G. R. G., & Xu, L. C. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.07.002 · Cited by 267
Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying
Hill, M. D., Kelly, G. W., Lockhart, G. B., & Van Ness, R. A. (2013) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12032 · Cited by 266
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J., & Saffar, W. (2012) · Journal of Financial Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6803.2012.01322.x · Cited by 266
Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand
Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2001) · Pacific-Basin Finance Journal · doi:10.1016/s0927-538x(01)00022-1 · Cited by 265
“Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century”
Smith, M., Yagan, D., Zidar, O., & Zwick, E. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz020 · Cited by 263
“…income.6 However, we stress that returns to top ownermanagers need not be socially optimal and can include returns to unproductive behavior like rent-seeking (Krueger 1974; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991) or returns to elite connections (Fisman 2001; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Zimmerman 2019).”
Decentralization, Collusion, and Coal Mine Deaths
Jia, R., & Nie, H. (2017) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00563 · Cited by 261
Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?
Guidolin, M., & La Ferrara, E. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1978 · Cited by 259
Unchecked intermediaries: Price manipulation in an emerging stock market
KHWAJA, A., & MIAN, A. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.014 · Cited by 259
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Khanna, T., & Yafeh, Y. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.787625 · Cited by 256
The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics
Burgess, R., Hansen, M., Olken, B., Potapov, P., & Sieber, S. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17417 · Cited by 255
Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean
Pritchett, L., & Summers, L. (2014) · doi:10.3386/w20573 · Cited by 224
Belitski, M., & Grigore, A.-M. (2022) · European Planning Studies · doi:10.1080/09654313.2021.1985436 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Fisman, R.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-09-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1095-1102
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2002030205
- Cited by
- 2,968
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 58.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.