The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility
Abstract
Crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored. We study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information. The asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal. In contrast to the case with exogenous information, our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information: multiplicity is ensured with small noise. In addition, we show that: (a) multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself; (b) less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique; and (c) similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another's actions, highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally.
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Citations
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Cited by
Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
Angeletos, G.-M., & Pavan, A. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.x · Cited by 619
Self-citationMora Cortez, R., & Johnston, W. J. (2020) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2020.05.004 · Cited by 472
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Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector
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Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
Metadata
- Authors
- Angeletos, G.-M., & Werning, I.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2006-11-01
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1720-1736
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W3123686250
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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