The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Social Norms
Open accessAbstract
Research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by their peers. Within an agency framework, we model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent's cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action, defined to be the average level of that action chosen by the agent's peer group. We show how endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of monetary incentives, determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations, and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents' sensitivities to social norms are unobservable. (JEL D23, D82, D86, Z13)
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Cites
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The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The Productivity of Investment Projects
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IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12006 · Cited by 995
Religious Social Norms and Corporate Financial Reporting
Dyreng, S. D., Mayew, W. J., & Williams, C. D. (2012) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2012.02295.x · Cited by 562
Financial statement comparability and expected crash risk
Kim, J.-B., Li, L., Lu, L. Y., & Yu, Y. (2016) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.12.003 · Cited by 452
Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, D. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.999 · Cited by 421
Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment
Bradler, C., Dur, R., Neckermann, S., & Non, A. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2291 · Cited by 268
Metadata
- Authors
- Fischer, P., & Huddart, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-08-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1459-1475
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121489462
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 24.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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