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Cited by 421

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

Sliwka, Dirk·2007·American Economic Review

Abstract

An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types, a third type of agent is introduced. These “conformists” have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do as well. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the “social norm”), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy, trust in a favorable norm may be signaled. (JEL D64, D82, J41, Z13)

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Metadata

Authors
Sliwka, D.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2007-05-01
Volume
97
Issue
3
Pages
999-1012
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3123618071
Cited by
421
References
53
FWCI
46.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.97.3.999
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Sliwka, D. (2007). Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.3.999

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.