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Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda
Open accessAbstract
I study the role of financial incentives as signals of job characteristics when these are unknown to potential applicants. To this end, I create experimental variation in expected earnings and use that to estimate the effect of financial incentives on candidates’ perception of a brand-new health-promoter position in Uganda and on the resulting size and composition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a lower positive externality for the community and discourage agents with strong pro-social preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract more applicants and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better. (JEL D82, I18, J31, J63, M52, O15)
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Cites
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Colin Cameron, A., & Miller, D. L. (2015) · Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.3368/jhr.50.2.317 · Cited by 5,037
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Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
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Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.544 · Cited by 1,753
A multifaceted program causes lasting progress for the very poor: Evidence from six countries
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No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery
Ashraf, N., Bandiera, O., & Jack, B. K. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014 · Cited by 101
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Clark, H., Coll-Seck, A. M., Banerjee, A., Peterson, S., Dalglish, S. L., Ameratunga, S., Balabanova, D., Bhan, M. K., Bhutta, Z. A., Borrazzo, J., et al. (2020) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(19)32540-1 · Cited by 1,105
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
Colonnelli, E., Prem, M., & Teso, E. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20181491 · Cited by 272
Metadata
- Authors
- Deserranno, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2019-01-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 277-317
- ISSN
- 1945-7782 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7790
- OpenAlex
- W2906886681
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 30.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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