Cited by 106Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesPublic Policy and Administration ResearchDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery

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Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Jack, B. Kelsey·2014·Journal of Public Economics

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014

Cites

38 of 38 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Ashraf et al. (2014) found that social signaling was a powerful driver of prosocial behavior.

    “In one of the more famous nudge experiments, Ashraf et al. (2014) found that social signaling was a powerful driver of prosocial behavior.”

    From Fostering Belonging, Transforming Schools: The Impact of Restorative Practices (2023) · cites this paper as Ashraf et al. (2014)

    Section 5.4 (page unavailable) finds that visible star rewards increased stylists’ condom sales more when they had more peers, supporting a role for social comparison in this setting. But the authors say the effect might reflect showing off, learning from peers, or encouragement by others; they do not establish social signaling specifically as the powerful driver of prosocial behavior. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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  • Monetary incentives have neutral or negative effects on prosocial behavior in public settings but positive effects in private settings.

    “In field experiments, Ariely et al. (2009) and Ashraf et al. (2014), for example, find that monetary incentives have neutral or negative effects on prosocial behavior in public settings but positive effects in private settings.”

    From Unintended reward costs: the effectiveness of customer referral reward programs for innovative products and services (2019) · cites this paper as Ashraf et al. (2014)

    Section 4.2 (Sales; page unavailable) reports that neither monetary-incentive treatment significantly affected condom sales in the public-health field experiment, supporting the neutral-effects portion. Section 5.2 (Pro-social motivation and the response to incentives; page unavailable) says payment status was not observable to outsiders across treatments. The paper does not compare public and private settings or find a positive effect in a private setting. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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2 of the 40 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Chetty, R., E. Saez, and L. Sandor (2012). What policies motivate pro-social behavior? an experi- ment with referees at the journal of public economics. Mimeo, Harvard University.
  2. Oyer, P. and S. Schaefer (2011). Personnel economics: hiring and incentives, Volume 4, pp. 1769- 1823. Elsevier.

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Authors
Ashraf, N., Bandiera, O., & Jack, B. K.
Affiliations
  • Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (GB)
  • Tufts University (US)
Corresponding author
Ashraf, Nava
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2014-12
Volume
120
Pages
1-17
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1520812396
Cited by
101
References
40
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 3
FWCI
22.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
  • Cadmus - EUI Research Repository (European University Institute) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
Funders
  • 3ie
  • STICERD
  • WAPPP
  • HBS DRFD
  • Sustainability Science Program
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
extrinsic rewards, non-monetary incentives, financial incentives, public service delivery, HIV prevention, condom distribution, agent performance, prosocial motivation, incentive design

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