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Cited by 1,022

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incentives in Organizations

Gibbons, Robert·1998·Journal of Economic Perspectives

Abstract

In this paper, the author summarizes four new strands in agency theory that help him think about incentives in real organizations. As a point of departure, The author begins with a quick sketch of the classic agency model. He then discusses static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen Kerr's argument; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations. The author concludes by suggesting two avenues for further progress in agency theory: better integration with organizational economics, as launched by Coase (1937) and reinvigorated by Williamson (1975, 1985), and cross-pollination with other fields that study organizations, including industrial relations, organizational sociology, and social psychology.

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Show all 3 references

Research works printed but not linked: 37

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Gibbons, R.
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Published
1998-11-01
Volume
12
Issue
4
Pages
115-132
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3122965505
Cited by
1,022
References
3
FWCI
50.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives in Organizations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/jep.12.4.115
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Gibbons, R. (1998). Incentives in Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.4.115

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.