The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives in Organizations
Abstract
In this paper, the author summarizes four new strands in agency theory that help him think about incentives in real organizations. As a point of departure, The author begins with a quick sketch of the classic agency model. He then discusses static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen Kerr's argument; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations. The author concludes by suggesting two avenues for further progress in agency theory: better integration with organizational economics, as launched by Coase (1937) and reinvigorated by Williamson (1975, 1985), and cross-pollination with other fields that study organizations, including industrial relations, organizational sociology, and social psychology.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms
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Identity and the Economics of Organizations
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The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gibbons, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1998-11-01
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 115-132
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122965505
- Cited by
- 1,022
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 50.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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