Cited by 130Climate Change Policy and EconomicsEnergy, Environment, Economic GrowthGlobal trade and economics

The Strategic Value of Carbon Tariffs

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Böhringer, Christoph, Carbone, Jared C., Rutherford, Thomas F.·2016·American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

Abstract

We ask whether the threat of carbon tariffs might lower the cost of reductions in world carbon emissions by inducing unregulated regions to adopt emission controls. We use a numerical model to generate payoffs of a game in which a coalition regulates emissions and chooses whether to employ carbon tariffs against unregulated regions. Unregulated regions respond by abating, retaliating, or ignoring the tariffs. In the Nash equilibrium, the use of tariffs is a credible and effective threat. It induces cooperation from noncoalition regions that lowers the cost of global abatement substantially relative to the case where the coalition acts alone. (JEL D58, F13, F18, H23, Q54, Q58)

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Crossref · 10.1257/pol.20130327

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  • Many studies indicate that BCAs would shift the economic consequences of emission reduction from abating industrialized countries to nonabating countries.

    “Many studies indicate that such BCAs would shift the economic consequences of emission reduction from abating industrialized countries to nonabating countries (93, 156-160).”

    From Carbon Leakage, Consumption, and Trade (2022) · cites this paper as [156]

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Authors
Böhringer, C., Carbone, J. C., & Rutherford, T. F.
Affiliations
  • Chair of Economic Policy, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, D-26111 Oldenburg, Germany (e-mail: )
  • Colorado School of Mines (US)
  • University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
Venue
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Published
2016-02-01
Volume
8
Issue
1
Pages
28-51
ISSN
  • 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
  • 1945-774X
OpenAlex
W3125074174
Cited by
130
References
42
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2
FWCI
14.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Economic Journal Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
Keywords
carbon tariffs, carbon leakage, international climate policy, emission reduction, coalition formation, retaliation, Nash equilibrium, credible threats

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