The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Firm Strategies in the “Mid Tail” of Platform-Based Retailing
Open accessAbstract
While millions of products are sold on its retail platform, Amazon.com itself stocks and sells only a very small fraction of them. Most of these products are sold by third-party sellers who pay Amazon a fee for each unit sold. Empirical evidence clearly suggests that Amazon tends to sell high-demand products and leave long-tail products for independent sellers to offer. We investigate how a platform owner such as Amazon, facing ex ante demand uncertainty, may strategically learn from these sellers' early sales which of the “mid-tail” products are worthwhile for its direct selling and which are best left for others to sell. The platform owner's “cherry-picking” of the successful products, however, gives an independent seller the incentive to mask any high demand by lowering his sales with a reduced service level (unobserved by the platform owner). We analyze this strategic interaction between a platform owner and an independent seller using a game-theoretic model with two types of sellers—one with high demand and one with low demand. We show that it may not always be optimal for the platform owner to identify the seller's demand. Interestingly, the platform owner may be worse off by retaining its option to sell the independent seller's product, whereas both types of sellers may benefit from the platform owner's threat of entry. The platform owner's entry option may reduce consumer surplus in the early period, although it increases consumer surplus in the later period. We also investigate how consumer reviews influence the market outcome.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Competition in two-sided markets
Armstrong, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x · Cited by 3,315
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
The long tail: why the future of business is selling less of more
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-2783 · Cited by 2,869
Frictionless commerce? A comparison of Internet and conventional retailers
Brynjolfsson, E., & Smith, M. D. (2000) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.46.4.563.12061 · Cited by 2,498
Strategies for Two-Sided Markets
Eisenmann, T. R., PARKER, G. G., & Alstyne, M. V. (2006) · Harvard business review · Cited by 2,305
Reducing buyer search costs: Implications for electronic marketplaces
Bakos, J. Y. (1997) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1676 · Cited by 2,259
Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design
Parker, G. G., & Van Alstyne, M. W. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0400 · Cited by 1,700
Customer satisfaction and loyalty in online and offline environments
Shankar, V., Smith, A. K., & Rangaswamy, A. (2003) · International Journal of Research in Marketing · doi:10.1016/s0167-8116(03)00016-8 · Cited by 1,558
Cited by
A strategic framework for artificial intelligence in marketing
Huang, M.-H., & Rust, R. T. (2021) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-020-00749-9 · Cited by 2,059
Digital marketing: a framework, review, and research agenda
Kannan, P. K., & Li, H. “. (2017) · International Journal of Research in Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.ijresmar.2016.11.006 · Cited by 1,707
Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing
Abhishek, V., Jerath, K., & Zhang, Z. J. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2230 · Cited by 1,082
Self-citationCompeting with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com
Zhu, F., & Liu, Q. (2018) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2932 · Cited by 546
Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature
Rietveld, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2021) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206320969791 · Cited by 504
Kwark, Y., Chen, J., & Raghunathan, S. (2017) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2017/41.3.05 · Cited by 350
Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under spillovers from online to offline sales
Yan, Y., Zhao, R., & Liu, Z. (2018) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.011 · Cited by 344
The optimal combination between selling mode and logistics service strategy in an e-commerce market
Qin, X., Liu, Z., & Tian, L. (2021) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2020.07.029 · Cited by 316
Threat of platform‐owner entry and complementor responses: Evidence from the mobile app market
Wen, W., & Zhu, F. (2019) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3031 · Cited by 315
The Strategic Role of Third‐Party Marketplaces in Retailing
Mantin, B., Krishnan, H., & Dhar, T. (2014) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.12203 · Cited by 295
Kharrazi, H., Gonzalez, C. P., Lowe, K. B., Huerta, T. R., & Ford, E. W. (2018) · Journal of Medical Internet Research · doi:10.2196/10458 · Cited by 84
Algorithmic Supervisor and Employee Performance
Gu, W., Li, M., & Zhang, S. (2025) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1177/10591478251331095 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Jiang, B., Jerath, K., & Srinivasan, K.
- Venue
- Marketing Science
- Published
- 2011-09
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 757-775
- ISSN
- 0732-2399 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-548X
- OpenAlex
- W2103970467
- Cited by
- 443
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 11.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.