The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
Open accessAbstract
In many business transactions, labor-management relations, international conflicts, and welfare-state reforms, bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible anymore. These entitlements seem to shape negotiation behavior considerably. By using the novel setup of a “bargaining with claims” experiment, we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions, and (dis)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a “moral property right” that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.
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Cited by
A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Gjerstad, S. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.001 · Cited by 631
Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games
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Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · Cited by 362
Bellemare, C., Krger, S., & van Soest, A. (2008) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00860.x · Cited by 336
Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment
Abbink, K., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z · Cited by 281
Metadata
- Authors
- Gächter, S., & Riedl, A.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2005-02
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 249-263
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2105855020
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 33.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.