The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior
Open accessAbstract
This paper develops a model of dynamic pricing with endogenous intertemporal demand. In the model, there is a monopolist who sells a finite inventory over a finite time horizon. The seller adjusts prices dynamically to maximize revenue. Customers arrive continually over the duration of the selling season. At each point in time, customers may purchase the product at current prices, remain in the market at a cost to purchase later, or exit, and they wish to maximize individual utility. The customer population is heterogeneous along two dimensions: they may have different valuations for the product and different degrees of patience (waiting costs). We demonstrate that heterogeneity in both valuation and patience is important because they jointly determine the structure of optimal pricing policies. In particular, when high-value customers are proportionately less patient, markdown pricing policies are effective because the high-value customers would buy early at high prices while the low-value customers are willing to wait (i.e., they are not lost). On the other hand, when the high-value customers are more patient than the low-value customers, prices should increase over time to discourage inefficient waiting. Contrary to intuition, we find that strategic waiting by customers may sometimes benefit the seller: when low-value customers wait, they compete for availability with high-value customers and thus increase their willingness to pay. Our results also shed light on how the composition of the customer population affects optimal revenue, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Finally, we consider the long-run problem of selecting the optimal initial stocking quantity.
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Citations
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Cited by
Omnichannel Retail Operations with Buy-Online-and-Pick-up-in-Store
Gao, F., & Su, X. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2473 · Cited by 690
Self-citationOptimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers
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Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers
Cachon, G. P., & Swinney, R. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0948 · Cited by 610
Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance
Su, X., & Zhang, F. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0886 · Cited by 522
Self-citationOnline and Offline Information for Omnichannel Retailing
Gao, F., & Su, X. (2017) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2016.0593 · Cited by 469
Self-citationStrategic Capacity Rationing to Induce Early Purchases
Liu, Q., & van Ryzin, G. J. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0832 · Cited by 463
Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance
Su, X. (2009) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1080.0240 · Cited by 460
Self-citationDynamic pricing and learning: Historical origins, current research, and new directions
den Boer, A. V. (2015) · Surveys in Operations Research and Management Science · doi:10.1016/j.sorms.2015.03.001 · Cited by 427
Shen, Z. M., & Su, X. (2007) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00291.x · Cited by 337
Self-citationDynamic Pricing and Inventory Control of Substitute Products
Dong, L., Kouvelis, P., & Tian, Z. (2009) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1080.0221 · Cited by 311
Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers
Papanastasiou, Y., & Savva, N. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2378 · Cited by 307
Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Strategic Consumers and Oligopolistic Competition
Levin, Y., McGill, J., & Nediak, M. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0936 · Cited by 296
Are Consumers Strategic? Structural Estimation from the Air-Travel Industry
Li, J., Granados, N., & Netessine, S. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1860 · Cited by 281
On the Value of Commitment and Availability Guarantees When Selling to Strategic Consumers
Su, X., & Zhang, F. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0991 · Cited by 265
Self-citationStrategic and tactical price decisions in hotel revenue management
Abrate, G., & Viglia, G. (2016) · Tourism Management · doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2016.02.006 · Cited by 224
Dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers
Chen, Y., & Zhang, Z. J. (2009) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.03.002 · Cited by 144
Online Product Reviews-Triggered Dynamic Pricing: Theory and Evidence
Feng, J., Li, X., & Zhang, X. (. (2019) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2019.0852 · Cited by 117
Strategic consumer behavior in online hotel booking
Masiero, L., Viglia, G., & Nieto-Garcia, M. (2020) · Annals of Tourism Research · doi:10.1016/j.annals.2020.102947 · Cited by 70
Optimal Multiperiod Pricing with Service Guarantees
Borgs, C., Candogan, O., Chayes, J., Lobel, I., & Nazerzadeh, H. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1839 · Cited by 60
“We do not provide a summary of this line of literature here, but we refer the reader to excellent surveys by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004), Bitran and Caldentey (2003), Chan et al. (2004), Shen and Su (2007), and Aviv et al. (2009).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Su, X.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2007-05
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 726-741
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3124865326
- Cited by
- 613
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 48.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.