The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing
Open accessAbstract
In recent years, online retailers (also called e-tailers) have started allowing manufacturers direct access to their customers while charging a fee for providing this access, a format commonly referred to as agency selling. In this paper, we use a stylized theoretical model to answer a key question that e-tailers are facing: When should they use an agency selling format instead of using the more conventional reselling format? We find that agency selling is more efficient than reselling and leads to lower retail prices; however, the e-tailers end up giving control over retail prices to the manufacturer. Therefore, the reaction by the manufacturer, who makes electronic channel pricing decisions based on their impact on demand in the traditional channel (brick-and-mortar retailing), is an important factor for e-tailers to consider. We find that when sales in the electronic channel lead to a negative effect on demand in the traditional channel, e-tailers prefer agency selling, whereas when sales in the electronic channel lead to substantial stimulation of demand in the traditional channel, e-tailers prefer reselling. This preference is mediated by competition between e-tailers—as competition between them increases, e-tailers prefer to use agency selling. We also find that when e-tailers benefit from positive externalities from the sales of the focal product (such as additional profits from sales of associated products), retail prices may be lower under reselling than under agency selling, and the e-tailers prefer reselling under some conditions for which they would prefer agency selling without the positive externalities. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND OPTIMUM PRODUCT DIVERSITY
Dixit, A., Stiglitz, J. E., Dixit, A. K., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1975) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.268957 · Cited by 7,391
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
Singh, N., & Vives, X. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555525 · Cited by 2,930
Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A., & Thisse, J.-F. (1992) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2450.001.0001 · Cited by 2,324
Direct Marketing, Indirect Profits: A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design
Chiang, W.-Y. K., Chhajed, D., & Hess, J. D. (2003) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.1.1.12749 · Cited by 1,806
Jeuland, A. P., & Shugan, S. M. (1983) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.2.3.239 · Cited by 1,114
Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer
Choi, S. C. (1991) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.10.4.271 · Cited by 1,036
An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration
McGuire, T. W., & Staelin, R. (1983) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.2.2.161 · Cited by 952
An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration
McGuire, T. W., & Staelin, R. (2008) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1070.0335 · Cited by 923
Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2042 · Cited by 777
Shubik, M., & Levitan, R. (1980) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674433403 · Cited by 551
Balasubramanian, S. (1998) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.17.3.181 · Cited by 549
An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints
Mathewson, G. F., & Winter, R. A. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003667 · Cited by 488
Firm Strategies in the “Mid Tail” of Platform-Based Retailing
Jiang, B., Jerath, K., & Srinivasan, K. (2011) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1110.0656 · Cited by 443
Self-citationBattle of the Retail Channels: How Product Selection and Geography Drive Cross-Channel Competition
Brynjolfsson, E., Hu, Y. (., & Rahman, M. S. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.1062 · Cited by 409
Bonanno, G., & Vickers, J. (1988) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2098466 · Cited by 408
Strategic Decentralization in Channels
Moorthy, K. S. (1988) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.7.4.335 · Cited by 367
A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels
Iyer, G., & Villas-Boas, J. M. (2003) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.40.1.80.19134 · Cited by 359
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition
Iyer, G. V. (1998) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.17.4.338 · Cited by 350
Zettelmeyer, F. (2000) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.37.3.292.18777 · Cited by 285
Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and Coordination
Cachon, G. P., & Kök, A. G. (2010) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.1122 · Cited by 275
Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555414 · Cited by 262
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition
Jyer, G., & Olin, J. M. (2016) · Cited by 262
Supply responses to digital distribution: Recorded music and live performances
Mortimer, J. H., Nosko, C., & Sorensen, A. (2012) · Information Economics and Policy · doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.01.007 · Cited by 226
Internet Channel Entry: A Strategic Analysis of Mixed Channel Structures
Yoo, W. S., & Lee, E. (2011) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1100.0586 · Cited by 222
Competition in the Computer Industry: Online Versus Retail
Goolsbee, A. (2001) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00159 · Cited by 178
The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance
Mathewson, F., & Winter, R. A. (1998) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1023/a:1007774803225 · Cited by 125
Piracy or promotion? The impact of broadband Internet penetration on DVD sales
Smith, M. D., & Telang, R. (2010) · Information Economics and Policy · doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.02.001 · Cited by 107
PLATFORM OR WHOLESALE: DIFFERENT EFFECTS ON RETAILERS OF ONLINE PRODUCT REVIEWS
Kwark, Y., Chen, J., & Raghunathan, S. (n.d.) · Cited by 6
Cited by
Channel Structures of Online Retail Platforms
Ha, A. Y., Tong, S., & Wang, Y. (2022) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2021.1011 · Cited by 443
Competitive Strategies for Brick-and-Mortar Stores to Counter “Showrooming”
Mehra, A., Kumar, S., & Raju, J. S. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2764 · Cited by 400
Supplier Encroachment, Information Sharing, and Channel Structure in Online Retail Platforms
Ha, A. Y., Luo, H., & Shang, W. (2022) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.13607 · Cited by 375
Kwark, Y., Chen, J., & Raghunathan, S. (2017) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2017/41.3.05 · Cited by 350
Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under spillovers from online to offline sales
Yan, Y., Zhao, R., & Liu, Z. (2018) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.011 · Cited by 344
Metadata
- Authors
- Abhishek, V., Jerath, K., & Zhang, Z. J.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2016-08
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 2259-2280
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3124805376
- Cited by
- 1,082
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 43.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.