The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
Open accessAbstract
A channel rebate is a payment from a manufacturer to a retailer based on retailer sales to end consumers. Two common forms of channel rebates are linear rebates, in which the rebate is paid for each unit sold, and target rebates, in which the rebate is paid for each unit sold beyond a specified target level. When demand is not influenced by sales effort, a properly designed target rebate achieves channel coordination and a win-win outcome. Coordination cannot be achieved by a linear rebate in a way that is implementable. When demand is influenced by retailer sales effort, a properly designed target rebate and returns contract achieves coordination and a win-win outcome. Other contracts, such as linear rebate and returns or target rebate alone, cannot achieve coordination in a way that is implementable. Contrary to the view expressed in the literature that accepting returns weakens incentives for retailer sales effort, we find that the provision of returns strengthens incentives for effort.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
Cachon, G. P., & Lariviere, M. A. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215 · Cited by 2,469
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy
Spengler, J. J. (1950) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256964 · Cited by 1,614
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Jeuland, A. P., & Shugan, S. M. (1983) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.2.3.239 · Cited by 1,114
Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities
Pasternack, B. A. (1985) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.4.2.166 · Cited by 1,017
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5 · Cited by 942
The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
Tsay, A. A. (1999) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.45.10.1339 · Cited by 886
Cited by
Diamantopoulos, A., & Siguaw, J. A. (2006) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2006.00500.x · Cited by 3,410
Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts
Cachon, G. P. (2003) · Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science · doi:10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7 · Cited by 2,683
Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
Cachon, G. P., & Lariviere, M. A. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215 · Cited by 2,469
The effect of supply chain glitches on shareholder wealth
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2003) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2003.02.003 · Cited by 1,074
Association Between Supply Chain Glitches and Operating Performance
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0353 · Cited by 755
Omnichannel Retail Operations with Buy-Online-and-Pick-up-in-Store
Gao, F., & Su, X. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2473 · Cited by 690
The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption
Cohen, M. C., Lobel, R., & Perakis, G. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2173 · Cited by 548
Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain
Chen, J., Zhang, H., & Sun, Y. (2012) · Omega · doi:10.1016/j.omega.2011.11.005 · Cited by 528
Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination
Li, L., & Zhang, H. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0851 · Cited by 520
Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance
Su, X. (2009) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1080.0240 · Cited by 460
Channel Structures of Online Retail Platforms
Ha, A. Y., Tong, S., & Wang, Y. (2022) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2021.1011 · Cited by 443
Bounded Rationality in Newsvendor Models
Su, X. (2008) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0200 · Cited by 411
Optimization and Coordination of Fresh Product Supply Chains with Freshness‐Keeping Effort
Cai, X., Chen, J., Xiao, Y., & Xu, X. (2010) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01096.x · Cited by 339
Buyer vendor coordination models in supply chain management
Sarmah, S. P., Acharya, D., & Goyal, S. K. (2006) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2005.08.006 · Cited by 304
Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a ‘cap-and-trade’ system
Du, S., Ma, F., Fu, Z., Zhu, L., & Zhang, J. (2015) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10479-011-0964-6 · Cited by 252
The link between supply chain fit and financial performance of the firm⋆
Wagner, S. M., Grosse‐Ruyken, P. T., & Erhun, F. (2012) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2012.01.001 · Cited by 252
Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns
Ferguson, M., Guide, V. D. R., & Souza, G. C. (2006) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1060.0112 · Cited by 252
Competition and coordination in a three-tier supply chain with differentiated channels
Lan, Y., Li, Y., & Papier, F. (2018) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2018.02.032 · Cited by 64
Metadata
- Authors
- Taylor, T. A.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2002-08
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 992-1007
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2120470870
- Cited by
- 858
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 21.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.