The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Range-Normalization Model of Context-Dependent Choice: A New Model and Evidence
Open accessAbstract
Most utility theories of choice assume that the introduction of an irrelevant option (called the decoy) to a choice set does not change the preference between existing options. On the contrary, a wealth of behavioral data demonstrates the dependence of preference on the decoy and on the context in which the options are presented. Nevertheless, neural mechanisms underlying context-dependent preference are poorly understood. In order to shed light on these mechanisms, we design and perform a novel experiment to measure within-subject decoy effects. We find within-subject decoy effects similar to what have been shown previously with between-subject designs. More importantly, we find that not only are the decoy effects correlated, pointing to similar underlying mechanisms, but also these effects increase with the distance of the decoy from the original options. To explain these observations, we construct a plausible neuronal model that can account for decoy effects based on the trial-by-trial adjustment of neural representations to the set of available options. This adjustment mechanism, which we call range normalization, occurs when the nervous system is required to represent different stimuli distinguishably, while being limited to using bounded neural activity. The proposed model captures our experimental observations and makes new predictions about the influence of the choice set size on the decoy effects, which are in contrast to previous models of context-dependent choice preference. Critically, unlike previous psychological models, the computational resource required by our range-normalization model does not increase exponentially as the set size increases. Our results show that context-dependent choice behavior, which is commonly perceived as an irrational response to the presence of irrelevant options, could be a natural consequence of the biophysical limits of neural representation in the brain.
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Cites
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“Moreover, adaptation is an efficient way for the nervous system to adjust to variable statistics of the environment to improve its local information capacity or discriminability power [45–50].”
BackgroundNormalization as a canonical neural computation
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“More specifically, the response to the value of the saccade in the receptive field is divided by the weighted response of the saccadic values of all options presented in the choice set, similarly to what has been proposed for sensory neurons [55,56].”
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Cited by
Expectation in perceptual decision making: neural and computational mechanisms
Summerfield, C., & de Lange, F. P. (2014) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3838 · Cited by 832
Normalization is a general neural mechanism for context-dependent decision making
Louie, K., Khaw, M. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1217854110 · Cited by 341
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Cognitive and Neural Bases of Multi-Attribute, Multi-Alternative, Value-based Decisions
Busemeyer, J. R., Gluth, S., Rieskamp, J., & Turner, B. M. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.12.003 · Cited by 267
Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A. (2022) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-011616 · Cited by 254
Resource-rational decision making
Bhui, R., Lai, L., & Gershman, S. J. (2021) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2021.02.015 · Cited by 168
The case against economic values in the orbitofrontal cortex (or anywhere else in the brain).
Hayden, B. Y., & Niv, Y. (2021) · Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.1037/bne0000448 · Cited by 127
A neural mechanism for conserved value computations integrating information and rewards
Bromberg-Martin, E. S., Feng, Y.-Y., Ogasawara, T., White, J. K., Zhang, K., & Monosov, I. E. (2024) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-023-01511-4 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Soltani, A., De Martino, B., & Camerer, C.
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2012-07-19
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- e1002607
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2137973279
- Cited by
- 175
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 6.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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